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ABSTRACT

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT:
A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS

BY

MING-HUNG YAO
AUGUST 2007

Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Economics

This dissertation seeks to investigate the relationship between public sector
employment and fiscal decentralization. We develop a theoretical model that helps us
understand the interaction of the central executive’s and subnational governor’s decisions
on the level of public employees at the central and subnational levels. Our empirical work
shows that fiscal decentralization policy shifts central government employees to the
subnational government level and that the increase in public employees at the subnational
government level overwhelms the decrease in public employees at the central level. As a
result, the level of total public sector employees increases with the degree of fiscal
decentralization of a country. We also find that the levels of total public sector employees
as a percentage of population are higher in unitary country systems than those in federal

xii

countries. The level of public employment also increases with the degree of urbanization
and with the exposure to risk of a country.
This is somewhat a surprising result. Typically, more public employment is
associated with an excessive number of public sector employees, and, therefore, with
unproductive spending. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization policy has been
generally thought to result in an increase in allocative efficiency, since a decision on
public expenditures made by a level of government that is closer and more responsive to
a local constituency is more likely to reflect the demand for local services than a decision
made by a remote central government. In addition, decentralization has been thought as
having the potential of improving competition among governments and of facilitating
technical innovations. Therefore, one might expect that fiscal decentralization should
help to retrench the public sector employment. However, from our empirical result, we
find that subnational governors without taking full responsibility for subnational public
finance tends to bloat the levels of subnational government employees and ask the central
government to pay the bill. As a result, the level of total public sector employees
increases with fiscal decentralization policy. These findings are much in line with Oates’
and Wallis’ anticipated results, but they are based on different explanations.
Employing the two most commonly used spatial dependency tests, Moran’s I and
Getis and Ord’s G statistics, we also find evidence of spatial dependency in terms of the
level of public sector employees as a percentage of population among the countries in our
dataset. This finding suggests that while using country’s own domestic variables to
explain the level of public sector employment, we should not ignore that the neighboring
countries’ policies also play an important role in determining it.

xiii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that the government activities play an important role in the
modern economy. Government influences the economy via several instruments, such as
fiscal policies and monetary policies. Public sector employment, which accounts for a
considerable share of total employment in many economies, is an important tool of fiscal
policy and has attracted a great deal of attention over the past two decades (Gregory &
Borland, 1999). Today bloated bureaucracies and over-staffed public enterprises are very
common problems in developing countries, especially in transition economies, where the
shift from plan to market requires millions of workers to be relocated. An excessive
number of ministries, duplications of functions, or the existence of ghost workers has
been identified as major instances of unproductive spending (Rama, 1997). Consequently,
retrenchment of public sector employment is becoming an important issue of economic
reform in these countries.
Decentralization, defined as the transfer of authority and responsibility for public
functions from the central government to subordinate or autonomous government
(subnational government hereafter) organizations or the private sector, has been a
worldwide trend in the last two decades (Rondinelli, 1999). 1 An economic argument for
decentralization is that it increases allocative efficiency. First, a decision about public
expenditures that is made by a level of government that is closer and more responsive to a
local constituency is more likely to reflect the demand for local services than the one that
is made by a remote central government. Second, decentralization leads to competition
among governments and enhances innovations (Ford, 1999). Due to these two arguments
1

For more detail of the definition of decentralization, please refer to Chapter Four.
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2
for decentralization, one might suggest that fiscal decentralization may be a remedy for
bloated bureaucracies and over-staffed public enterprise in developing countries. In this
dissertation we try to answer whether the fiscal decentralization policy would help to
retrench the public sector employment.
In Appendix A, we show the cross-county public sector employment data as a
percentage of population from 1985 to 2005 for Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD hereafter) and non-OECD countries. 2 From those data, we can
observe several trends. First, while public sector employment has grown in some
countries, it has shrunk in the others for the period 1985-2005. We can call this the time
series variation of public employment. Second, the size of public sector employment in
some countries is larger than that in other countries in any year. We can call this the
cross-sectional variation of public employment. This dissertation seeks to explain these
variations over time and across countries in public sector employment. Besides gaining
an understanding of the sources of public employment variation over time and across
countries, we are also interested in examining the process of public employment
decentralization in some countries around the world and the degree of public employment
decentralization in some countries growing faster than the others. We can call this the
structural dimension variation in public employment. Appendix B shows the public
employment as a percentage of population at the central and subnational government

2

These data are from the International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset, published by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) bureau of statistics. The website is http://laborsta.ilo.org/, accessed
June 11, 2007. The data are available since 1985. Before 1996, the data are available every five years. Since
then the data are available every year. The latest year data available are 2004. In order to compare the data
after 1995 to those before 1996, we calculate the five year average for the year 2000 and 2005. That is, the
observations of year 2000 and 2005 are the unweighted average from year 1996 to 2000 and from 2001 to
2004 respectively. The list of OECD member countries can be found at OECD web page at:
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed June 11,
2007.
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levels for OECD and selected non-OECD countries in 1995 and 2000. 3
Three hypotheses have been used to explain these variations in public
employment. The first is a conventional economic explanation and it is known as
Wagner’s law. This “law” argues that economic development creates demand for new
types of government services (Kraay & van Rijckeghem, 1995; Rama, 1997; SchiavoCampo et al., 1997a, 1997b; Tait & Heller, 1984). The second is a political-economy
explanation which views public employment as a means by which politicians conceal
redistribution in favor of specific groups (Alesina et al., 2000; Alesina et al., 2001; Gelb
et al., 1991; Gimpelson & Treisman, 2002; Robinson & Verdier, 2002). The third is an
international economic explanation, according to which public employment is linked with
the exposure to foreign trade of a country (Rama, 1997; Rodrik, 1996, 1997).
Although all these three hypotheses may seem to explain part of the variation in
public employment, they do not seem to account for all the relevant facts. If Wagner’s
law is correct, one would expect richer countries or richer subnational regions to have
higher level of public employees. However, for example, in Italy we find that the poorer
regions have higher level of public employees than the richer regions (Alesina et al.,
2001). If public employment is a tool for politicians to transfer benefits to specific groups,
one should expect countries or subnational regions with the same population to have the
same amount of such patronage flows. Is this the case? In reality, such benefits correlate
with the degree of ethnic division or income inequality but not the amount of population
(Alesina et al., 2000). Finally, if setting up a higher level of public employees is an

3

This data are from the World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset, which is published by the
World Bank. The website is http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/, accessed June 11, 2007. In this
dissertation the terminology of subnational government is referring to the summation of state (or province
in some countries) and local governments.
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instrument for officials to conciliate the impact of trade-related dislocation, why do they
choose such as an inefficient tool (Robinson & Verdier, 2002)? Retraining or transfer
schemes would be far more cost-effective policy, whether the politicians’ goal is to insure
vulnerable workers or to buy votes (Gimpelson & Treisman, 2002).
While these three hypotheses might work well in explaining some facts about
public employment levels over time and across countries, none of these hypotheses
appears to provide a clear rationale for the structural dimension, that is, a relative change
of public employment at the subnational government level compared to that at the central
government level. Decentralization helps us to explain the change of the structural
dimension of public sector employment. With fiscal decentralization policy, the central
government transfers some responsibilities to the subnational governments. As a result,
we expect that the level of public sector employees at the central government level
decreases and that at the subnational government level increases with the degree of fiscal
decentralization. The overall impact of fiscal decentralization on total public sector
employment depends on these two opposing effects. If the magnitude of the reduction in
the central government employment overwhelms the increase in the subnational
government employment, then total public sector employment shrinks with the degree of
fiscal decentralization. In other words, the fiscal decentralization policy helps to retrench
the public sector employment. On the other hand, if the magnitude of the increase in the
subnational government employment overwhelms the reduction in the central
government employment, then total public sector employment grows with fiscal
decentralization. Both cases are supported by some hypotheses as we will discuss in
Chapter Two. Moreover, we also want to see what factors might affect the magnitudes of

5
these two effects.
While using the relative change of public employment at the subnational
government level compared to that at the central government level to explain the
variation in public employment across countries, we should not ignore the potential role
played by “spatial effects,” that is policy makers may be affected by their “neighbors”
when they design their fiscal policy. The first explanation for the existence of spatial
effects is that there exists externalities across countries and, therefore, fiscal policy
choices are interactive. A second explanation is that citizens can evaluate the
performances of their policy makers by comparing the same policy choices taken by the
neighboring countries (Redoano, 2003). 4 Given the relevance of these two explanations,
we will test for the presence of spatial effects as a determinant of the level of one
country’s public sector employment.
Public sector employment is different from private sector employment in that the
decision-making on public sector employment and wage determination occurs in a
political environment, whereas private sector decision-making takes place in a market
environment (Ehrenberg & Schwarz, 1986; Gregory & Borland, 1999). Politician or
bureaucrats might have goals that are different from those of the owners of private sector
firms. Due to such differences, we could understand public sector employment only by
considering the public labor market as a separate entity.
In this dissertation, we develop a theoretical model of public employment in an
attempt to offer a different hypothesis that has the potential of explaining the structural
variation in public employment and perhaps the time-series and cross-sectional variations
in public employment. In the empirical chapter of the dissertation, we use two separate
4

The second explanation is known as yardstick competition, initially explored by Besley and Case (1995).
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datasets to test the hypotheses derived from our theoretical model. The main goal of this
dissertation is to analyze the role of fiscal decentralization policy on public sector
employment. Furthermore, we want to find out the determinants of public employment at
the central and subnational government levels and to the aggregate level as well. Besides,
we also want to detect whether there exists evidence of spatial effects in determining the
level of one country’s public sector employment. This dissertation consists of five
chapters. In the current chapter, we motivate the main topic of this research. In Chapter
Two, we review and summarize previous research on public sector employment and its
relationship with fiscal decentralization. In Chapter Three, we develop a theoretical
model to analyze the relationship between the degree of fiscal decentralization and public
sector employment level. In Chapter Four, we describe the dataset we use in this study
and present the empirical results based on the data we have. Chapter Five offers the
conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, we review previous studies on public sector employment, and then
we discuss why fiscal decentralization might play an important role in the determination
of public sector employment. In the first section of this chapter, we discuss several
hypotheses, as suggested by previous studies, which can help to explain the difference of
public sector employment among regions within a country and across countries. In the
second section, we discuss why fiscal decentralization policy might influence public
sector employment. In the third section, we review literatures of fiscal policy interaction
across countries, while our focus is on the expenditure side.

Three Hypotheses on Public Employment
In this section, we discuss three hypotheses that seek to explain the difference in
public sector employment across countries. The first hypothesis is Wagner’s law. It argues
that economic development creates demand for new types of government service. The
second hypothesis is the rent-seeking hypothesis, as first suggested by Gelb et al. (1991).
This hypothesis argues that public employment is viewed as a means by politicians to
conceal redistribution in favor of specific groups. The third hypothesis is the social
insurance hypothesis, as suggested by Rodrik (1996). This hypothesis argues that public
employment could be used to buffer the population against external risk. We review these
three hypotheses in turn and then report on empirical studies that have found support for
each of these hypotheses.

7
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Wagner’s Law
First, Wagner’s law argues that economic development creates demand for new
types of government services. In other words, government services rise at a faster rate
than economic development. Economic development clearly correlates cross-nationally
with larger public sectors. Empirically, the size of public sector is measured in terms of
either the share of government expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP hereafter) or
the share of government employees to population. The size of public sector has been
generally measured through government expenditures, but the determinants of public
sector employment have only been discussed in a few studies, namely those by Tait and
Heller (1984), Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995), Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b), Rama
(1997), Rodrik (1996; 1997) , Alesina et al. (2000), Alesina et al. (2001), Gimpelson and
Treisman (2002) and Marques-Sevillano and Rossello-Villallonga (2004). These studies
vary in their country coverage as well as in their methodology. Some of these studies are
concentrated on a particular country, such as the case study on the United States of
Alesina et al. (2000), the case study on Italy of Alesina et al. (2001), the case study on
Russia of Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) and the case study on Spain of MarquesSevillano and Rossello-Villallonga (2004). The others are cross country studies.
Most cross country studies confirm, or conditionally confirm Wagner’s law, such
as in Tait and Heller (1984), Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995), Schiavo-Campo et al.
(1997b) and Rama (1997). Tait and Heller (1984) use a cross country dataset of 61
countries for 1980 to investigate whether there are any common factors explaining the
size of public sector employment. 5 Their main result is that government employees per
5

If the data is not available for that year, they use the closest available year data.
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capita tends to increase as per capita income rises, thus supporting the validity of the
alternative test of Wagner’s law. Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995) use a panel dataset of
34 developing countries and 21 OECD countries from 1972 to 1992 to examine the
determinants of public sector employment and wages based on an efficiency wage model.
They find that government employment is positively associated with the resource
constraint, which is the revenue-to-GDP ratio in the case of developing countries and
GDP per capita in the case of OECD countries. Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b) developed
a cross country dataset on central and subnational government employment and wage
statistics for almost 100 countries in the early 1990s, both advanced and less developed
countries. 6 For the entire sample, they find that the level of government employees is
positively correlated with per capita income and thus confirm Wagner’s law. However,
for the sample of OECD countries, this association is not statistically significant, which
indicates that Wagner’s law may become inoperative beyond a certain level of
development. Rama (1997) uses an unbalanced panel dataset of general government
employment covering 90 countries for the 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. 7 He finds that
at low levels of economic development, general government employment increases with
output per capita, as predicted by Wagner’s law. However, the relationship is not
monotonic but quadratic, with the turning point at around 14,000 dollars per capita, at
1985 PPP prices.
From the empirical results of these cross country studies, we find that Wagner’s
law is confirmed, or conditionally confirmed. The interesting finding is that the public
6

The dataset has been updated. One more period, the year of 2000, has been added in the dataset. The
dataset is available at http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/, accessed June 6, 2007. Please refer to
Footnote 3 and Appendix B.
7
In his empirical study, Rama (1997) measures the size of public sector as the share of general government
employees to labor force, instead of population.
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sector employment grows with economic development but the relationship is not
monotonic. Beyond a certain level of development, this relationship becomes
insignificant and Wagner’s law becomes inoperative.

Rent-Seeking Hypothesis
Wagner’s law works well in explaining the levels of public employees across
countries but not always so well within them. For example, Alesina et al. (2001) find that
the number of public employees in the poorer regions (the South) in Italy is significantly
larger than that in richer regions (the North). Therefore, we suspect that there would
appear to be some factors other than economic development influencing the level of
public employment within a country. Now, we turn our focus on the rent-seeking
hypothesis, as suggested by Gelb et al. (1991). They develop a theoretical model to argue
that governments in developing countries should, and do, provide valuable goods and
services which generate a derived demand for factors of production. However, the public
sector differs from the private sector in the extent to which the public sector is subject to
political pressures for employment. Rent seeking and rent creating behavior can give rise
to a wasteful diversion of resources into the public sector over and above the derived
demand for resources. Robinson and Verdier (2002) explain why public sector
employment is politically attractive, even that it might be socially highly inefficient. They
argue that this is because public sector employment is a good commitment device
between politicians and voters. From their theoretical model, they find that inefficient
redistribution and clientelism become a relatively attractive political strategy in situations
with high inequality and low productivity. Neither of these two studies provides empirical
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evidence. Next we review some empirical studies that find support for this hypothesis.
Along the same lines, Alesina et al. (2000) argue that politicians may use
disguised redistributive policies, such as public employment, in order to circumvent
political opposition to explicit tax-transfer schemes. Their empirical results are consistent
with the prediction of the hypothesis in that in the United States cities politicians appear
to use public employment as a redistributive device. They find that the city level of public
employees in the United States is significantly higher in cities where income inequality
and ethnic fragmentation are higher.
Alesina et al. (2001) examine the regional distribution of public employment in
Italy. They explain why the number of public employees in the poorer regions (the South)
in Italy is significantly larger than that in the richer regions (the North). They compute
the amount of expenditure on public employment due to redistribution by estimating the
excess of public employees and wage premium in the poorer regions compared to a
benchmark economy. They calculate that about half of the public wage bill in the south of
Italy can be identified as a subsidy. They conclude that both the size of public
employment and the level of public wages are used as redistributive devices.
Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) develop a two-period game played by the central
executive and subnational governors to explain the public employment difference at the
regional level in Russia. In their model the politicians view public employment as a tool
to increase their expected vote shares, by which public employment could be viewed as a
good commitment device between politicians and voters. A number of results are
consistent with their hypotheses. An interesting finding is that the level of public sector

12
employees at the jurisdiction with an “opposite governor” tends to be higher. 8
In summary, we find that not only economic development may influence the level
of public employees, but some political motivations also do. However, we do not know
any cross country study that examines empirically the rent-seeking model. We suspect the
reason is the qualitative property of political variables. As we will cover in the empirical
chapter of this dissertation, we know that there are some dummy variables that are able to
describe the political relationship between the central and subnational governments.
However, this political relationship is always a matter of degree and not a matter of a
closed question with a yes or a no answer. Therefore, a dummy variable may be
misleading. This problem may become more serious when we do the cross-country
comparison. 9

Social Insurance Hypothesis
Besides the hypothesis based on Wagner’s law, most studies we have discussed so
far have argued that the difference of the level of public employment is determined by
political reasons: governments use public employment as a tool for generating and
redistributing rents. Rodrik (1996, 1997) suggests an alternative hypothesis to explain
this difference: relatively safe government jobs represent partial insurance against
undiversifiable external risk faced by the domestic economy. He argues that countries
with great exposures to external risk are likely to have higher levels of public employees.
Rodrik’s (1997) model shows how public employment can play a welfare-enhancing
8

They define an opposite local governor as a governor in ethnic republics with locally credible bases on
which to allege central mistreatment and being affiliated with the communist opposition to incumbent
president Yeltsin.
9
See Chapter Four for more discussion on the political variable issue.
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social insurance role in an economy buffered by external risks. In his empirical work, he
uses the Labor Market Data Base assembled by the World Bank and the maximum
sample size for his regression model is 76 countries (cross section data). In view of this
small sample size, he supplements his analysis on employment with data on real
government consumption as a share of GDP. His empirical result shows that exposure to
external risk, measured as the share of the sum of imports and exports of goods and
services on GDP, is robustly associated with levels of government employees across
countries. Although there is enough evidence to suggest that the rent hypothesis cannot be
dismissed, as discussed before, a more benign motive, that of providing social insurance
through job creation, accounts well for cross-country differences in the extent of public
employment.
Rama (1997) uses the same measure of exposure to external risk as employed by
Rodrik (1996) but increases the country sample and time period (unbalanced panel data)
to explain the difference of the level of public employees across countries. Rama’s (1997)
empirical work shows that the level of government employees increases significantly
with exposure to external risk, as first claimed by Rodrik (1997).
There are still some other factors that have been found to be able to explain the
differences in the level of public employees across countries. For example, Kraay and van
Rijckeghem (1995) find that the level of government employees is negatively associated
with government debt. Besides this, they also find that governments hire countercyclically and according to the degree of urbanization. Political pressure, caused by high
unemployment rates, might raise demand for public sector jobs as a counter-cyclical
device. In addition, urbanization stimulates the demand for certain pubic services, such as
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infrastructure, social order etc., which drives the public sector to increase government
employees. Rama (1997) points out that the level of public sector employees appears to
be higher in Latin America and South Asia. The hypothesis that all the regional dummies
are equal to zero is rejected at the 5% significant level. Therefore, regional features may
explain a certain portion of the variance in government employment across countries.
Marques-Sevillano and Rossello-Villallonga (2004) argue that the difference could be
explained by the dependency ratio. 10 They find that the number of public employees at
the regional government in Spain increases with the dependency ratio. This is because the
dependency ratio might be associated to the demand for education and health, which
drives the government to hire more employees to provide such services.

Public Employment and Decentralization in the Previous Literature
In this section, we review the previous studies that link public sector employment
and fiscal decentralization. 11 As we have mentioned above, most of the previous literature
does not directly discuss the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public sector
employment, except for Marques-Sevillano and Rossello-Villallonga (2004). In the first
part of this section, we review prior studies on the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and public sector size, measured as the ratio of either government
expenditures or revenues to GDP. Then, we introduce Marques-Sevillano and RosselloVillallonga’s (2004) empirical study, which directly addresses the issue of the impact of
fiscal decentralization on public sector employment in Spain.
The earliest argument to address the impact of fiscal decentralization on public
10

They define the dependency ratio as the share of population at the age greater than 65 or less than 16 over
total employment instead of population.
11
For more detail about the definition of fiscal decentralization, please refer to Chapter Four.
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sector size could be tracked back to Musgrave (1959). He argues that under a highly
decentralized public sector, there is likely to be comparatively little in the way of
assistance to the poor for two reasons. First, sorting out along Tiebout lines implies
relatively income-homogeneous jurisdictions with little scope for redistribution from the
rich to the poor within jurisdictions. Second, the fear of attracting the mobile poor with
relatively generous support programs tends to deter the adoption of such programs. Both
reasons suggest that the scope for public relief programs will be more constricted under a
relatively decentralized fiscal system. In other words, a comparatively larger budget is
expected under a highly centralized government because of a greater demand for
assistance to the poor.
Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) Leviathan hypothesis is another classic argument
in the discussion of the relationship between decentralization and public sector size. In
their model, government is a monolithic entity, whose goal is to maximize fiscal revenues.
This can only be limited by constitutional constraints. According to their hypothesis,
decentralization of tax and spending decisions introduces competition among
governmental units seeking to attract citizens and other mobile resources, and thereby
constrains its access to tax and other fiscal instruments. In short, the Leviathan hypothesis
implies that, other things being equal, the size of the public sector should vary inversely
with the extent of fiscal decentralization, which is consistent with Musgrave’s (1959)
argument.
Both the Musgrave’s (1959) and Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) points of view
are based on the perspective of allocation efficiency and they support that
decentralization would lead to a small public sector. However, there is another point of
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view that argues the size of public sector increases with the context of fiscal
decentralization. A first argument by Oates (1972, 1985) is that greater decentralization
may result in the loss of certain economies of scale with a consequence increase in
administration costs. The Leviathan hypothesis has been criticized that it ignores the
supply efficiency. If economies of scale in the provision of public services are substantial,
decentralization may result in a larger public sector (Stein, 1998). Moreover, since the
central government is more likely to offer qualified people better career and individuals
tend to choose offers with more possibilities for promotion, the resulting poor quality of
subnational bureaucrats is likely to reduce the benefits of decentralization and result in
weak public expenditure management and higher supply costs of public services
(Prud'homme, 1995).
A second argument is made on the basis of political participation by Wallis. 12
Wallis argues that since individuals have more control over public decisions at the
subnational than at the national level, they will wish to empower the public sector with a
wider range of functions and responsibilities carried out at more localized levels of
government. As a result, the level of subnational government employment grows with the
degree of fiscal decentralization. Based on these two arguments, we expect that the public
sector tends to be larger with a higher degree of fiscal decentralization.
In practice, there is a good number of empirical studies seeking to test the
Leviathan hypothesis, such as Giertz (1983), Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), Wallis and
Oates (1988), Zax (1989) and Forbes and Zampelli (1989). However, neither of these
studies measures the public sector size by the number of public employees because the
Leviathan hypothesis suggests to focus on the level of revenue that the state extracts from
12

Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985).
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the economy. Besides the revenue-related variables, such as government tax revenues as
a fraction of personal income that has been used in Forbes and Zampelli (1989), Giertz
(1976), Nelson (1987), Oates (1985) and Zax (1989), other measures, such as government
expenditures as a fraction of personal income, are used to measure the size of public
sector as well, for example, Giertz (1983), Oates (1985) and Oates and Wallis (1988).
Empirically, there is no consistent evidence to support or to reject the Leviathan
hypothesis. While Wallis and Oates (1988) and Zax (1989) find supporting evidence for
the Leviathan hypothesis, Giertz (1983), Oates (1985), Nelson (1987) and Forbes and
Zampelli (1989) reject it.
So far, there appears to be only one empirical study by Marques-Sevillano and
Rossello-Villallonga (2004), explaining how the number of public employee at the
regional government is influenced by the process of decentralization. These authors
define the process of fiscal decentralization as the transfer of responsibilities of education
and health from the central to the regional governments. In their empirical study, they
group the regional governments in Spain at that time according to whether they have
received or not these two responsibilities to measure the process of fiscal
decentralization. 13 The regional governments with receiving both responsibilities are
grouped as highly decentralized group. The regional governments with receiving only the
responsibility of education are grouped as middle decentralized group. The control group
is those regional governments with none of these two responsibilities.
Due to the process of decentralization that started in Spain in the 1980s, 17
regional governments have been created and public employment needs have not been
entirely covered with employees transferred from the central government. The data from
13

Nowadays all regional governments in Spain have been transferred education and health.
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their empirical study shows that the increase in the number of public employees at the
regional government level is 1.6 times the reduction of the public employees at the
central government during the period from 1990 to 2003. That is the number of total
public sector employees actually increased with the process of fiscal decentralization.
We are particularly interested in one of their empirical results. They find that the
ratio of regional public employees to total employment is significantly greater in the
regions receiving both responsibilities (education and health) from the central
government vis-à-vis the rest of the regions. Our theoretical model below is inspired by
this result. With the process of fiscal decentralization, the central government transfers
some responsibilities to the regional governments, which drives the increase in regional
government employees and the reduction in central government employees. The overall
impact of fiscal decentralization on total public sector employees depends on these two
opposing effects. If the magnitude of the increase overwhelms the reduction, then the
number of total public sector employees increases with the process of fiscal
decentralization. In this case, we confirm Oates’ (1972, 1985) and Wallis’ 14 argument that
decentralization tends to result in a larger public sector. On the other hand, if the
magnitude of increase is less than the reduction, the number of total public sector
employees decreases with the process of fiscal decentralization. In this case, the point of
view suggested by Musgrave (1959) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980) that
decentralization leads to leaner government will be supported.
Moreover, we are also interested in identifying any factors that may influence the
magnitude of these two effects. In the next chapter, we develop our own model with the
aim of better explaining the differences in public sector employment across countries and
14

Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985).
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answering the question we have presented whether the fiscal decentralization retrench the
public sector employment or not.

Public Expenditures and Spatial Effects in the Previous Literature
As indicated in Chapter One, policy makers may be affected by their “neighbors”
when they design their policy, which is known as spatial interaction or spatial effects.
There is now a large literature showing that spatial effects play an important role in
determining one country’s fiscal policy. This literature has used different theoretical
frameworks to rationalize the existence of spatial effects; these include spillover effects
(Case et al., 1993) and yardstick competition (Besley & Case, 1995; Bordignon et al.,
2003; Revelli, 2006). Regardless of the different theoretical explanations, the empirical
estimation of these models typically follows a common empirical framework (Case et al.,
1989). The spatial effects can be captured by using weight matrices which approximate
the potential spatial correlation either in the dependent variables or in the error terms, or
both. 15 In this section, we focus our review on the literature on spatial interaction on the
expenditure side of the budget, since it directly links to the topic of our study, the level of
public sector employment. Most of the previous empirical literature has used subnational
level data to detect special effects, for example, Baicker (2001), Case et al. (1989), Case
et al. (1993), Bordignon (2003) and Revelli (2006). Some other researches, such as
Redoano (2003) and Mbakile-Moloi (2006) have used cross country data to detect spatial
effects. Redoano (2003) found the evidence of spatial effects in terms of public
expenditures, using a dataset for 13 European Union (EU) countries for the period 198515

The empirical model captures the potential spatial correlation in the dependent variable is called the
spatial autoregressive model, in the error terms is called the spatial error model, and in both dependent
variable and error terms is called the general spatial model.
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1995. 16 His empirical shows that EU countries set their public expenditures at both the
aggregated and disaggregated levels, interdependently. Mbakile-Moloi (2006) also
detected evidence of spatial interaction on the expenditure side of the budget in 24
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region countries and 11 SubSaharan Africa (SSA) countries. 17
An interesting point of these two cross country studies is that both authors use a
dataset of “homogenous” countries. For example, these 13 European Union countries that
have been used in Redoano’s (2003) empirical estimation are all OECD countries.
Meanwhile, the 11 SSA countries and 24 SADC countries being used in Mbakile-Moloi’s
(2006) empirical estimation are all developing or undeveloped countries. The importance
of this observation is that with a “homogenous” dataset, the presence of spatial effects
might not be surprising since it is more possible for the policy maker of one country to be
affected or follow the policy of the neighboring country with similar GDP level or
infrastructure. There is also a greater chance that the spatial effects may be commingled
with other common but unobserved factors. On the other hand, spatial effects may not
exist between two neighbor but quite different countries, for example, one of which is
OECD and the other is non-OECD country or one developed and the other developing.
This is because with significant differences in institution, infrastructure and so on
between these two countries, spillover effects may not take place and, thus, spatial effects
may not be present. In particular, in many developing countries, politicians are not as
16

These countries are United Kingdom, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Netherlands, Sweden, and Portugal.
17
These 24 SADC countries are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Dem. Rep, Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia,
Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; these 11 SSA countries are
Botswana, Congo Dem. Rep, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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accountable to voters, and, therefore, yardstick competition may not be present. Both
arguments suggest that using a geographic border or distance to detect spatial effects
across countries may not be appropriate if the dataset includes both OECD and nonOECD or developed and developing countries. In this study, our dataset includes both
OECD and non-OECD countries; therefore, the empirical methodology utilized for a
weight matrix becomes very important. In our empirical work, we divide the countries
into six groups: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, Latin America
and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and OECD. 18 Countries in the same
group are likely to have similar culture or socio-economy background, and are more
likely to affect each other through spatial effects. In such a setting, given two countries
being in the same group, these two countries are viewed as neighbors, independently of
whether they share the same border or not. Once the way of creating our weight matrix
has been decided, it will be used to detect spatial effects in terms of public sector
employment level for all the countries in our dataset. The weight matrix and our
empirical results are presented in Chapter Four.

18

This categorization has been used in the empirical analysis of Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b).

CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL MODEL

In this chapter, we develop our theoretical model expanding on the work by
Gimpelson and Treisman (2002). We model the fiscal politics that determines the level of
public employees as a two-stage game played between the central government and a
subnational government. Politicians in this model act as what Niskanen (1968) calls
bureaucrats who seek to maximize their own utility function. 19 According to him, there
are several variables that may enter the bureaucrat’s utility function, such as salary, public
reputation and output of the bureau. In our model, we assume that the bureaucrat’s utility
function consists of two components: the level of public goods provided to the residents
and subnational government budget gap. The bureaucrat’s utility is positively associated
with the level of public goods provided and inversely with negative subnational
government budget gap.
We assume that there are two types of public goods: local public goods and
national public goods. Local public goods are only provided to the residents in the
particular jurisdiction following the decision of the governor in this jurisdiction. National
public goods are provided to all residents in the country following the decision of the
central authorities. The production functions of both public goods are of a Cobb-Douglas
form with two inputs, labor (public sector employment) and capital, which could be
represented mathematically as:
f ( m , K ) = mα ⋅ K β
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According to Niskanen (1971), bureaucracy has two basic characteristics: they are non-profit
organizations, and they are financed, at least in part, from a periodic appropriation or grant.
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where m is input of public sector employment and K is capital input. 20 We further
assume that the production technologies of local pubic goods in each jurisdiction are
identical. Thus, these two production coefficients, α and β , are constant across
jurisdictions in the country. All public expenditures go to pay the wages of the public
employees and the capital rental costs.
The model is set up as follows. Assume there is a country composed of one
central government with an executive and n jurisdictions, subscripted i = 1,2,..., n , each

with an governor and the same number of residents. The total amount of national
resources in this country are denoted by R , which are financed by a national proportional
income tax, t ⋅ Y , where t is the fixed tax rate and Y is the real GDP. In period 1, the
central government sets the degree of fiscal decentralization, θ , which is the share of R
that allocates equally to the subnational governments, and the rest share, (1 − θ ) , is kept
by the central government. 21 We denote the amount of resource allocated to jurisdiction i
as ri , where ri =

θ ⋅R
n

. Thus the budget constraints for central and each subnational

government are (1 − θ ) ⋅ R and

θ ⋅R
n

, respectively. In period 2, the subnational governor

in jurisdiction i receives the transfers,

20

θ ⋅R
n

, and sets the level of public employees in its

In reality, the public sector might have certain level of control over the prices of labor and capital;
however, for the purpose of simplicity, we assume the prices are fixed and we normalize them to 1. This
assumption also implies that the labor supply is a horizontal line and unemployment is not allowed.
21
This assumption might be true, especially in developing countries. Although the subnational governments
in developing countries have their own-source revenues, they usually do not have full autonomy in these
revenues: subnational governments are authorized to collect the tax but not allowed to change the tax rate
or tax base without the permission of the central government. This implies that the central government can
decide the subnational revenue level by setting the tax rates and tax bases of subnational revenues.
Therefore, total amount of national resources in this country are controlled by the central government.
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jurisdiction, denoted by mi . If we follow Bird and Vaillancourt (1998), this process of
fiscal decentralization is what has been termed a delegation: the subnational governor has
the authority to decide the level of public goods provided in this jurisdiction but the
discretion to raise taxes is limited. 22
As we have assumed that the bureaucrat’s utility function consists of the level of
local public goods provided to the residents and subnational government deficits, and it is
positively correlated to the level of local public goods and inversely correlated to the
negative budget gap, the utility function of the subnational governor in jurisdiction i ,
E (Vi ) , can be shown as:
E (Vi ) = f (mi ) − (1 − σ ) ⋅ π (ci )

where mi , f (mi ) and ci are the amount of public employees, the production function of
local public goods and the subnational government budget gap ratio in jurisdiction i ,
respectively. The subnational government budget gap ratio in jurisdiction i is defined as
the ratio of budget gap to revenue. The subnational governor in jurisdiction i chooses to
hire the amount of mi public employees to maximize his utility and provide the level of
f (mi ) local public goods to the residents in this jurisdiction. We assume the production

function is a concave function, that is, f ' (mi ) > 0 and f " (mi ) < 0 , ∀ mi > 0 . The
level of local public goods of jurisdiction i is given by f (mi , K i ) = miα ⋅ K iβ . In
equilibrium, we have K i* = mi* ⋅ β α , and the total expenditure of jurisdiction i is
mi* ⋅ (1 + β α ) . In addition, the production function can be reduced to
f (mi ) = miα ⋅ (mi ⋅ β α ) β = ( β α ) β ⋅ miα + β .
22

For more detail of the definition of fiscal decentralization see Chapter Four of this dissertation.
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In the objective function, π (ci ) is the political cost function of a subnational
budget gap, which is caused by over-staffing in this jurisdiction. We assume that the
subnational governments are able to finance the gap via other sources, for example,
borrowing from subnational-government-own banks. Such subnational government
budget constraints are so-called “soft budget constraints.” 23 The budget gap ratio of
jurisdiction i can be represented by

mi ⋅ (1 + β α ) − ri
m ⋅ (1 + β α )
, or i
− 1 , where
ri
ri

mi ⋅ (1 + β α ) and ri are the expenditure and revenue of jurisdiction i . ci < 0 means that
there is a positive budget gap, ci > 0 means there is a negative budget gap, and ci = 0
means that the budget gap is zero in jurisdiction i . We assume the political cost is zero as

ci ≤ 0 and it is positive and a convex function as ci > 0 , that is, π (ci ) > 0 , π ' (ci ) > 0 and

π " (ci ) > 0 , ∀ci > 0 . To assure the existence of a solution and to avoid a corner solution,
we need further assumptions for this utility maximization problem: f ' (mi ) → ∞ as

mi → 0 , f ' (mi ) → 0 as mi → ∞ , π ' (ci ) → 0 as ci → 0 , and π ' (ci ) → ∞ as ci → ∞ .
With soft budget constraints, the subnational governments can increase
expenditures without eventually facing the full cost (Rodden et al., 2003). The coefficient,

σ , with the value between 0 and 1, captures this political relationship between the central
and subnational governments in the country. It determines the ratio of the political cost,

π (ci ) , that is shifted from the subnational governor to the central executive. So,
(1 − σ ) ⋅ π (ci ) captures the political costs that remain with the subnational government.

23

The term soft budget constraint was first introduced by Kornai (1992) to describe how state-own
enterprises could rely on increased subsidies if they increased their loss. Rodden et al. (2003) provide an
appropriate definition for our model: A soft budget constraint describes the situation when an entity (say, a
subnational government) can manipulate its access to funds in undesirable way.
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There are three properties in the subnational bureaucrat’s utility function. First, if
the subnational government provides higher level of public goods, the subnational
governor obtains higher level of utility. Second, hiring too many employees causes a high
level of negative subnational government budget gap, which is harmful to the subnational
governor’s utility function. In the model, (1 − σ ) ⋅ π (ci ) is the penalty to the subnational
government for over-staffing. A rational governor would set mi = mi* , such that

ci* =

n ⋅ mi* ⋅ (1 + β α )
− 1 > 0 , where mi* and ci* are the reaction function of the governors
θ ⋅R

of jurisdiction i with respect to the central executive’s decision in period 1. The proof is
straightforward as below:
The utility maximization problem for the governor of jurisdiction i is defined as:
max E (Vi ) = f (mi ) − (1 − σ ) ⋅ π (ci )
{ mi }

subject to

ci =

n ⋅ mi ⋅ (1 + β α )
−1.
θ ⋅R

Solving the utility maximization problem, we have the following first order condition:
∂E (Vi )
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎤
= f ' (mi ) − (1 − σ ) ⋅ π ' (ci ) ⋅ ⎢
⎥⎦ = 0 .
∂mi
⎣ θ ⋅R

Let F be the first order condition, and we have

⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎤
F = f ' (mi ) − (1 − σ ) ⋅ π ' (ci ) ⋅ ⎢
⎥⎦ .
⎣ θ ⋅R
The second order condition is
∂F
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α )⎤
= f " (mi ) − (1 − σ ) ⋅ π " (ci ) ⋅ ⎢
⎥⎦ .
∂mi
⎣ θ ⋅R
2

Since f " < 0 , (1 − σ ) > 0 , and π " (ci ) > 0 , the second order condition is negative and
satisfied for a utility maximization problem. It implies that the solution for this utility
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maximization problem exists. We denote the reaction function of the subnational
governor of jurisdiction i as mi* and mi∗ = mi (θ , σ ,α , β , n, R) . Consequently, we have
ci* =

n ⋅ mi* ⋅ (1 + β α )
− 1 = ci (θ ,σ ,α , β , n, R) .
θ ⋅R
Since f ' (mi* ) > 0 , (1 − σ ) > 0 and α , β and ri are all positive, we have

π ' (ci* ) > 0 . Because π (ci ) = 0 as ci ≤ 0 and π (ci ) is a convex function as ci > 0 , we
have shown that ci* > 0 .
The intuition behind this argument is that since the over-staffing cost to the
subnational government is proportionally shared by the central government, a rational
subnational governor would choose to over-staff until the marginal benefit of providing
public goods equals the marginal cost he needs to bear and ask the central executive to
pay part of the bill of subnational over-staffing. We can further show that the level of ci*
depends on the value of σ : the higher the value of σ , the higher the level of ci* . 24
Finally, the coefficient σ plays the essential political role in our model. Within
the country the extent of the political cost to the governor depends on whom voters blame
for the negative budget gap. In some countries, the public views the negative subnational
budget gap as a failure of the negotiation and crisis management skills of the central
government, even if objectively the subnational governments are more directly to be
blamed. We use σ , with the value between 0 and 1, to measure the propensity of voters
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*
*
*
*
Since ci* = n ⋅ mi ⋅ (1 + β α ) − 1 , we have ∂ci = n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⋅ ∂mi . The sign of ∂ci is determined by
∂σ
∂σ
∂σ
θ ⋅R
θ ⋅R

*
∂mi* . We will show that ∂mi
∂mi* is positive, we know that ∂ci* is
> 0 in Proposition 3 below. Since
∂σ
∂σ
∂σ
∂σ
positive as well.
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to blame the central government rather than the subnational government for the negative
budget gap of their jurisdiction. The higher the value of the political variable σ , the larger
the proportion of the political cost of negative subnational government gap that is shifted
to the central executive. We expect the value of σ is higher in some countries, where
subnational governments have less autonomous power in comparison to other countries
with a lower value of σ , where subnational governments have more autonomy, in
particular autonomy to raise their own taxes. For example, in countries like Greece and
Hungry, the subnational governors do not have power to collect a new tax or even raise or
reduce the tax rate. 25 They can only execute the expenditure or revenue policies enacted
by the central government and act as the agent of the central government executive.
Under these circumstances, subnational governments can more easily shift the political
costs of negative subnational budget gap to the central government. On the other hand, in
other countries, like the United States and Canada, each subnational government has
more autonomy in managing subnational government finances. Thus, subnational
governors in these countries would have to bear a larger part of the penalty of the
negative subnational government gap.
Now let us turn our attention to the central government executive’s utility
maximization problem. The central government executive’s utility consists of two
components: the level of national public goods provided to all residents in the country
and negative subnational government budget gaps. As was in the case of the subnational
governor utility, the central government executive’s utility is positively correlated to the
level of national public goods and is negatively correlated to the negative subnational

25

We will discuss more detail about the political variable in the next chapter.
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budget gap. The central government executive’s utility function, E (Vc ) , can be shown as:
n

E (Vc ) = g (1 − θ ) − σ ⋅ ∑ π (ci )
i =1

where g (1 − θ ) can be viewed as the production function of national public goods. 26 The
coefficient σ is the share of the political cost of negative subnational government budget
n

gaps that the central executive has to bear, and

∑ π (c ) is the total subnational
i =1

i

government budget gaps in the country. Again, we assume the production function is a
concave function, that is, g (1 − θ )' > 0 and g (1 − θ )"< 0 , ∀0 < (1 − θ ) < 1 . The central
executive chooses a degree of fiscal decentralization to maximize his utility. To assure the
existence of an inner solution, we further assume that g (1 − θ )' → ∞ as θ → 1 , and
g (1 − θ )' → 0 as θ → 0 . In equilibrium, the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization can

be shown mathematically as θ ∗ = θ (σ ,α , β , n, R) . Once θ * is determined, the optimal
level of central government employees, mc* , is also determined, which is given by

(

)

⎛ α ⎞
mc* = ⎜⎜
⎟⎟ ⋅ (1 − θ * ) ⋅ R = mc σ ,α , β , n, R .
α
β
⎝ + ⎠
There are two important properties of the central executive’s utility function. First,
the utility increases with the provision of national public goods, g (1 − θ ) , as was the case
for the subnational governor. Second, the central government executive has to bear part
of political cost caused by the negative subnational government budget gap, which is
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We assume that there is no budget deficit problem in the central government level, and, therefore, the
total expenditure for the central government is (1 − θ ) ⋅ R . Given the property of production function of a
Cobb-Douglas form and total expenditure of the central government, we can know the level of national
public goods provided. If we release this assumption and allow the central government has a limited
budget deficit, our result will be essentially the same.
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harmful to the central executive’s utility. The share that the central government has to
bear is σ ; as a result, the penalty function for the central government is given by
n

σ ⋅ ∑ π (ci ) .
i =1

The intuition of our theoretical model is that the subnational governor’s objective
is to maximize his utility and the only way to do so is through providing more local
public goods to his constituency. However, given the subnational government budget
constraint, providing too much public goods causes high level of negative subnational
government budget gap, which lowers his utility. Therefore, there is a trade-off between
providing local public goods and bearing negative budget gap in the subnational
governor’s decision. By the same token, the central government executive’s objective is
to increase his utility. He can increase his utility through providing more national public
goods to the people in this country. The only way for the central government to provide
more national public goods is to set up a lower degree of fiscal decentralization. However,
a very low degree of fiscal decentralization ratio means a very low level of resources
going to the subnational government, which causes a high level of negative budget gap in
the subnational government and indirectly lowers his utility. 27 This is because in some
countries, the public views negative subnational budget gaps as a failure of the
negotiation and crisis management skills of the central government, even if objectively
the subnational governments are more directly to be blamed. Therefore, both the central
government executive and the subnational governor need to bear the political cost of

For example, if θ → 0 , then g (1 − θ )' → 0 and ci → ∞ . Based on the inner solution assumption for
subnational governor’s utility maximization problem, we know π (ci ) → ∞ as ci → ∞ . Therefore, if θ → 0 ,
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then E (Vc ) → −∞ . This implies that a rational central executive will not set up a zero degree of fiscal
decentralization.
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negative subnational budget gaps. We introduce a political variable, σ , into our model to
represent the share of the political cost of negative subnational budget gaps that the
central executive has to bear. We again see a trade-off relationship between setting up a
lower degree of fiscal decentralization and bearing the cost of negative subnational
budget gaps in the central executive’s decision. In addition, these two decision makers are
linked by the political variable, σ . In our Proposition Three we show that the political
variable plays an important role in determining the level of public employees at both the
central and subnational governments.
Figure 1 helps us understand the intuition of our model. The purpose of building
this theoretical model is to find out the effect of some exogenous variables on the
subnational governor’s decision of hiring public employees and the central government
executive’s decision of choosing the degree of fiscal decentralization. Moreover, we want
to examine how the central government executive’s decision affects the subnational
governor’s decision. In order to investigate the interaction of the decisions of the central
government executive subnational governor, we use, as already mentioned, a game
theoretic approach. We can solve the two-period-two-player game by applying backward
induction. 28 In period 2, the subnational governor in jurisdiction i sets the level of public
employees in this jurisdiction, mi , to maximize his utility function:
max E (Vi ) = f (mi ) − (1 − σ ) ⋅ π (ci )
{ mi }

subject to

ci =

n ⋅ mi ⋅ (1 + β α )
−1.
θ ⋅R

(1)

By solving the maximization problem, we have the following first order condition:

28

Since we assume that these n jurisdictions are all identical, we can focus on one particular subnational
governor’s reaction to the central executive’s decision. Of course, this assumes that subnational
governments do not collude among themselves and that every subnational government is too small to really
affect what happens to other subnational governments.
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F=

∂E (Vi )
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎤
= f ' (mi ) − (1 − σ ) ⋅ π ' (ci ) ⋅ ⎢
⎥⎦ = 0 .
∂mi
⎣ θ ⋅R

(2)

Denote the reaction function of the subnational governor in jurisdiction i as

(

(

)

)

mi∗ = mi θ ,σ ,α , β , n, R and, therefore, we have ci* θ ,σ ,α , β , n, R =

n ⋅ mi* ⋅ (1 + β α )
−1.
θ ⋅R

∂F
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎤
The second order condition,
= f " (mi ) − (1 − σ ) ⋅ π " (ci ) ⋅ ⎢
⎥⎦ , has been
∂mi
⎣ θ ⋅R
2

shown to be negative and satisfied for a utility maximization problem, which assures the
existence of the solution. 29
In period 1, the central government executive sets the degree of fiscal
decentralization, θ , to maximize his utility function:
n

max E (Vc ) = g (1 − θ ) − σ ∑ π (ci )
{θ }

i =1

subject to

ci* =

n ⋅ mi* ⋅ (1 + β α )
−1.
θ ⋅R

(3)

We insert the constraint into the objective function and the central government
executive’s utility maximization problem can be shown as:
n
⎛ n ⋅ mi* ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎞
− 1⎟⎟ .
max E (Vc ) = g (1 − θ ) − σ ∑ π ⎜⎜
{θ }
θ ⋅R
i =1 ⎝
⎠

The corresponding first order condition is
G=

n
∂E (Vc )
n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎛ ∂mi mi ⎞
= − g ' (1 − θ ) − σ ∑ π ' ⋅
⋅⎜
− ⎟ = 0.
∂θ
θ ⋅R
⎝ ∂θ θ ⎠
i =1

(4)

We assume that the second order condition is satisfied for this utility maximization
problem, which implies

∂G
< 0 . This assures the existence of the solution of the central
∂θ

government. We denote the solution to the central government executive’s utility
29

Please see the proof of the second property of the subnational bureaucrat’s utility function.

33

(

)

maximization problem as θ ∗ = θ σ ,α , β , n, R and, therefore, the level of central

(

)

government employment is determined by mc* = mc σ ,α , β , n, R =

α ⋅R
⋅ (1 − θ * ) .
α+β

Total public sector employment and the degree of fiscal decentralization in this
country can be shown mathematically as:

(

)

(

)

(

m* = mc* + n ⋅ mi* = mc σ ,α , β , n, R + n ⋅ mi θ * , σ ,α , β , n, R = m* α , β ,σ , n, R

)

and

θ ∗ = θ (α , β ,σ , n, R ) .
We are now ready to derive some propositions, which help us to establish the
potential impact of some exogenous variables on the subnational governor’s decision of
hiring public employees and the central government executive’s decision of choosing the
degree of fiscal decentralization. In addition, we will be able to predict the reaction of the
subnational governor to the central executive’s decision.
Proposition One: The reaction function for the level of public employees in

jurisdiction i , mi* , increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization, θ , decided by the
central government in period 1. In addition, that the optimum level of central government
employment, mc* , decreases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. Thus, the impact of
fiscal decentralization on total public employees is ambiguous.
First, we prove that the reaction level of public employees of the subnational
government i, mi* , increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. The function F
denotes the first order condition of the utility maximization problem of the subnational
governor in jurisdiction i, and we have
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F=

∂E (Vi )
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎤
= f ' (mi ) − (1 − σ ) ⋅ π ' (ci ) ⋅ ⎢
⎥⎦ = 0 .
∂mi
⎣ θ ⋅R

Applying the implicit function theorem, we have
∂mi*
∂F / ∂θ
=−
∂θ
∂F / ∂mi

⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎛ n ⋅ mi ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎞
⎛ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎞⎤
− (1 − σ ) ⋅ ⎢π "⋅
⋅⎜−
⎟ + π '⋅⎜ −
⎟
2
θ ⋅R
θ ⋅R
θ 2 ⋅ R ⎠⎥⎦
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎣
=−
> 0.
2
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎤
f "−(1 − σ ) ⋅ π "⋅⎢
⎥⎦
⎣ θ ⋅R

(5)

Since f "< 0 and π "> 0 , the sign of Equation (5) is positive, which satisfies our
expectation. The higher the degree of fiscal decentralization, the higher the share of
national resources that go to the subnational governments and the less the national
resources that are controlled by the central government. Since all the expenditures are
exhausted to pay the wage of public employees and the capital rental costs, a high degree
of fiscal decentralization would drive the level of subnational government employees to
increase.
Second, we explain why the level of central government employees, mc* ,
decreases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. Given the assumption that there is no
budget deficit in the central government, the central government budget constraint is

(1 − θ ) ⋅ R . Since there are only two inputs in the production function of public goods, the
total expenditure of the central government can be expressed as mc* ⋅ (1 + β α ) . Given no
central government deficit assumption, we have mc* =

α ⋅R
⋅ (1 − θ * ) . From this equation,
α +β

we know the that level of central government employees, mc* , moves inversely with the
level of fiscal decentralization, θ .

35
Since fiscal decentralization leads to an increase in the number of public
employees at the subnational government level and a decrease at the central government
level, the overall impact of fiscal decentralization on total public sector employment is
ambiguous and depends on the relative dimensions of these two opposing effects. If the
magnitude of the former effect overwhelms the latter, total public sector employment
increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization; otherwise, public sector employment
decreases with it. The exogenous variable, σ , plays an important role in determining the
magnitude of these two effects; however, from the model we cannot find this relation
since the sign of

∂
∂σ

⎛ ∂mi* ⎞
⎜
⎜ ∂θ ⎟⎟ is ambiguous, which leaves this issue to be resolved in our
⎝
⎠

empirical estimation.
Proposition Two: From our theoretical model, we expect that a positive

relationship exists between GDP and subnational government employment, but this
relationship does not apply to GDP and central government employment. We first show
the proof of the first part of this proposition and then present a potential reason why this
positive relationship does not exist between GDP and central government employment
level:
By the chain rule, we have
∂mi* ∂mi* ∂ R
.
=
⋅
∂Y
∂ R ∂Y
To establish the sign of

(6)

∂mi*
∂R

, we apply the implicit function theorem and obtain
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∂mi*
∂F / ∂ R
=−
∂F / ∂mi
∂R
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎛ n ⋅ mi ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎞
⎛ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎞⎤
⎟⎟ + π '⋅⎜⎜ −
⎟⎟⎥
− (1 − σ ) ⋅ ⎢π "⋅
⋅ ⎜⎜ −
2
2
⋅
R
θ
⋅
⋅
R
R
θ
θ
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠⎦
⎣
=−
> 0.
2
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎤
f "−(1 − σ ) ⋅ π "⋅⎢
⎥⎦
⎣ θ ⋅R

(7)

From Equation (7), we know that the sign of the first term of the right hand side of
Equation (6) is positive. The sign of the second term of the right hand side of Equation (6)
is positive as well because in the model we assume the national resource is financed by a
proportional income tax, that is, R = t ⋅ Y . Thus,
∂R
= t > 0.
∂Y

(8)

Inserting Equation (7) and Equation (8) into Equation (6), we have
∂mi* ∂mi* ∂ R
=
⋅
∂Y
∂ R ∂Y
⎡
⎛
⎞
⎛
⎞⎤
(1 − σ ) ⋅ ⎢π "⋅ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⋅ ⎜⎜ − n ⋅ mi ⋅ (1 +2β α ) ⎟⎟ + π '⋅⎜⎜ − n ⋅ (1 + β2 α ) ⎟⎟⎥
θ ⋅R
θ ⋅R
θ ⋅R
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠⎦
⎣
=
⋅ t > 0.
2
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎤
f "−(1 − σ ) ⋅ π "⋅⎢
⎥⎦
⎣ θ ⋅R

(9)

The sign of Equation (9) is positive, which implies that the level of public employees of
the subnational government i , mi* , increases as GDP increases.
Second, we want to find out the effect of GDP on the central government
employment. Since the optimal level of central government employees is determined by
mc* =

α ⋅R
⋅ (1 − θ * ) , we have
α +β
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∂mc∗ α ⋅ R
=
∂Y α + β

⎛ ∂θ ∗ ⎞ α ⋅ (1 − θ * ) ∂ R
⎟⎟ +
⋅ ⎜⎜ −
⋅
∂Y
α+β
⎝ ∂Y ⎠

=

⎡ ∂θ ∗ ∂ R
⎤
⋅ ⎢−
⋅
⋅ R + (1 − θ * ) ⋅ t ⎥
α + β ⎣ ∂ R ∂Y
⎦

=

α ⋅t
α +β

α

(10)

⎡ ∂θ ∗
⎤
⋅ ⎢−
⋅ R + (1 − θ * )⎥.
⎣ ∂R
⎦

∂θ ∗
The sign of Equation (10) depends on the sign of
. To establish this, we apply the
∂R
implicit function theorem again. The function G represents the first order condition of
the central government executive’s utility maximization problem, and we have
G=

n
∂E (Vc )
n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎛ ∂mi mi ⎞
= − g ' (1 − θ ) − σ ∑ π ' ⋅
⋅⎜
− ⎟ = 0.
∂θ
θ ⋅R
⎝ ∂θ θ ⎠
i =1

Applying the implicit function theorem, we have
∂θ *
∂G / ∂R
=−
∂G / ∂θ
∂R
2
n ⎡
n2 ⋅ mi ⋅ (1+ β α) ⎛ ∂mi mi ⎞
n ⋅ (1+ β α) ⎛ ∂mi mi ⎞
n ⋅ (1+ β α) ⎛ ∂2mi ∂mi ∂R ⎞⎤
⎟⎥
⎜
⋅⎜
− ⎟ + π '⋅
− ⎟ −π '⋅
σ ⋅ ∑⎢π"⋅
−
⎜
3
2
2
⎜
θ ⎟⎠⎦⎥
⎝ ∂θ θ ⎠
i=1 ⎣
⎢
θ2 ⋅ R
θ ⋅ R ⎝ ∂θ θ ⎠
θ ⋅ R ⎝ ∂R∂θ
=−
.
∂G / ∂θ

(11)

The sign of Equation (11) is ambiguous by our model; as a result, we are not able to
predict the sign of our Equation (10). 30
We explain the rationale of Proposition Two as the following. First, the inequality
in Equation (9) satisfies our expectation. This result supports Wagner’s law, which
indicates that economic development creates demand for new types of government
services. In order to provide more public goods, the subnational governor has to hire
more public sector employees. Therefore, the level of public sector employment in the
subnational governments increases with GDP. However, according to Equation (10), we
30

There is a literature by Panizza (1999) that claims that the degree of fiscal centralization is negatively
correlated with income per capita, which implies that the sign of Equation (11) is positive.
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are not able to determine the impact of GDP on the central government employment. The
reason is that since the subnational government employment level increases with GDP,
the impact of GDP on subnational government budget gap is unpredictable. If that
increase in GDP worsens the subnational government budget gap, the central executive
might increase his utility by raising the degree of fiscal decentralization, which lowers the
penalty from negative subnational government budget gaps to the central executive.
Given the level of central government employment moves inversely to the degree of
fiscal decentralization, the increase in GDP might lower the level of central government
employees.
Total public sector employment of a country consists of the central and
subnational government employees. From the first part of Proposition Two, we know that
the impact of GDP on subnational government employment is positive, but from the
second part we know that the impact of GDP on central government employment is not
determined. As a result, we are not able to predict the impact of GDP on total public
sector employment, which leaves us another empirical task, and we will cover it in
Chapter Four.
Proposition Three: The level of subnational government employees increases

with the proportion of political cost caused by negative subnational governmental budget
gap that is shifted to the central government executive; on the other hand, the central
government employment increases with that proportion. The proof of the proposition is
as follows:
First, we want to prove the first part of this proposition. Applying implicit
function theorem, we have
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n ⋅ (1 + β α )
∂m
∂F / ∂σ
θ ⋅R
=−
=−
> 0.
2
∂σ
∂F / ∂mi
⎡ n ⋅ (1 + β α ) ⎤
f "−(1 − σ ) ⋅ π "⋅⎢
⎥⎦
⎣ θ ⋅R

π '⋅

*
i

(12)

The denominator of Equation (12) is negative since it is the second order condition for
the subnational governor’s utility maximization problem. Equation (12) implies that the
level of subnational government employment increases with the proportion of political
cost caused by the negative subnational government budget gap that the central
government has to bear.
Next, we want to determine the impact of the proportion of political cost of
negative subnational government budget gap that is shifted to the central government, σ ,
on the level of central government employees. Since mc* =

α ⋅R
⋅ (1 − θ * ) , we have
α +β

∂mc*
α ⋅ R ∂θ *
.
=−
⋅
∂σ
α + β ∂σ

(13)

Equation (13) shows that

derive the sign of

∂mc*
∂θ *
and
have opposite signs. Although we cannot
∂σ
∂σ

∂θ *
from implicit function theorem directly, we can still determine it
∂σ

indirectly from some equations we have had so far. By the chain rule, we have
∂mi*
∂θ ∂θ ∂mi
=
> 0 . From our
⋅
. According to Equation (12), we have known that
∂σ ∂mi ∂σ
∂σ
Proposition One, we know that

∂mi*
∂θ *
> 0 . 31 Thus, we know that
> 0 . According to
∂σ
∂θ

∂θ *
∂mc*
Equation (13),
> 0 implies that
< 0.
∂σ
∂σ
31

Refer to Equation (5).
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The overall effect of this political variable on the total public sector employment
is ambiguous and depends on the impact of political cost on the central and subnational
∂mi*
∂mc*
government employment, that is, it depends on the magnitudes of
and
. The
∂σ
∂σ
intuition of this proposition is quite straightforward. If the subnational governor is able to
shift the political cost of negative subnational budget gap to the central executive easily,
he is likely to hire more public employees to increase their utility and ask the central
government executive to pay the bill. To reduce the disutility from negative subnational
budget gap, the central government executive has to transfer a larger proportion of
resource to the subnational governments. This reduces the public employees at the central
government. The impact of the political variable on total public sector employment
depends on these two opposing effects. If the increase of subnational government
employees overwhelms the reduction of central government employees, total public
sector employment increases with that political variable. If not, total public sector
employment decreases. So the overall effect is not determined a priori and will have to be
established empirically.
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Figure 1: The Intuition of the Theoretical Model
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In the current chapter we develop the empirical framework that will support the
estimation and also present the results. We start by defining public sector employment
and some of the difficulties of defining this variable in the first section. Then in second
section we define our measure of fiscal decentralization and also elaborate on some
difficulties related to this variable. In the third section we restate our hypotheses derived
from our theoretical model. In the fourth section we discuss how we apply the
quantitative variable to the political variable we have introduced in our theoretical model.
Then we review some econometric issues related to the estimation in the fifth section. In
the final section we present the results and compare them to the previous findings in the
literature.

The Definition of Public Sector Employment

Our first task is to define the term “public sector employment.” Public sector
employees can be categorized according to their occupation, their employment status, and
who pays their salary. These criteria result in a complex array of cross-cutting public
employment categories and many gray definitional areas. Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997a,
1997b) point out some problems while defining public sector employment. For example,
in some countries teachers and health workers are included in the public sector
employment, while in other countries they are not. In some countries, paramilitary
personnel are included in the public sector employment because they have a role in
maintaining public order, while in other countries they are considered as military

42

43
personnel. Moreover, in some countries if the state/regional and local government
employees are paid from the central budget then they are still considered as subnational
government staff, whereas other countries designate them as central government staff. It
is not always clear how different countries define public sector employment, which
complicates the comparison of public sector employment across countries. In order to do
cross-country comparison of public sector employment, especially at the central
government and subnational government levels, we need reliable and comparable data.
The study by Tait and Heller (1984), as we have reviewed in the Chapter Two of
this dissertation, represents a beginning in the effort to assemble the statistics for an
international comparison of public sector employment and pay. They conducted a survey
from 64 International Monetary Fund (IMF hereafter) member countries in 1980.
According to them, public sector employment may occur at the central government level,
subnational government level and in the nonfinancial public enterprise sector. General
government employment is defined to include both central government and subnational
government employment. Public sector employment combines employees in the central
government, subnational governments and the nonfinancial public enterprise sector.
The main problem in this dataset is the functional category problem. The
functional category problem means the vertical distribution variation in public sector
employment across countries. For example, in most federal countries, important
education, health, police and administrative responsibilities are delegated to the
subnational government level. It is meaningless simply to compare the number of central
government employees across countries without taking into account that the central
government in one country may perform many of the functions that in another country
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are performed at the subnational government level. In this respect, their definition may
not always be satisfactory. Therefore, we need a sufficiently disaggregated database if our
goal is to compare public employment at the central and subnational government levels
across countries.
In their paper, Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b) developed a dataset, the World Bank
Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset, on central and subnational government
employment and wage statistics for almost 100 countries for 1995, including both
advanced and less developed countries. 32 In this dataset, education, health, and police
employees are excluded from both the central and subnational government employees,
and are calculated as a specific category. Most of the data were individually checked and
verified with primary sources. As a result, this dataset allows us to examine the
comparable data on central and subnational government employment; we believe this
dataset to be the most reliable one.
The definition of public sector employment of Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b) is
based on the United Nations System of National Accounts, 33 according to which,
“general government employees” comprises six mutually exclusive categories: 34
(1) Armed Forces: covers all enlisted personnel (including conscripts) and
professional military. Where possible, administrative employees of the Ministry of
Defense have been excluded and are accounted for as civilian central government
employees.
32

The dataset has been updated. One more period, the year of 2000, has been added in the dataset. The
World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset website is:
http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/, accessed June 11, 2007. Please refer to Footnote 3 and
Appendix B.
33
Statistical Office of the United Nations, "International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic
Activities, Third Revision," Statistical Papers Series M No. 4, Rev. 3, United Nations, New York, 1990.
34
For more detail of this definition of public sector employment refer to Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997a).
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(2) Civilian Central Government (excluding education, health, and police):
includes central executive and legislative administration in departments directly
dependent on the Head of State or the Parliament, together with all other ministries and
administrative departments, including autonomous agencies. Education, health, and
police employees paid by central government are accounted for separately.
(3) Subnational Government (excluding education, health, and police):
encompasses all government administration employees who are not directly funded by
the central government. It includes municipalities, as well as regional, provincial, or state
(in federal systems) employment. The distinction between central and subnational
government employment is budgetary, not geographic. If central government agencies are
geographically dispersed, but without changing their ultimate sources of finance, then the
staff in those agencies are included in the central government employees.
(4) Health employees: covers medical and paramedical staff (doctors, nurses, and
midwives) and laboratory technicians employed in government hospitals and other
government health institutions at all levels of government. Where possible, administrative
employees working in the health sector have been excluded and are accounted for as
civilian central government or subnational government employees, as appropriate.
(5) Education employees: covers primary and secondary public education
employment. Where possible, administrative employees of the Ministry of Education or
local school systems have been excluded and are accounted for as civilian central
government or subnational government employees, as appropriate.
(6) Police: includes all personnel - whether military, paramilitary or civilian - that
exercise police functions. This includes corps like Gendarmerie and Carabinieri. However,
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as a matter of convention, it does not include border guards. Police employment data
have been included, when readily available, but have not been gathered systematically. If
a police number is not available, these data are captured in the civilian central
government or subnational government categories.
Total public sector employment comprises general government employment and
employment in public enterprises (also called state-owned enterprises) that are majority
owned by government. The basic classification of public sector employment can be
represented visually as in Figure 2. 35
Although this dataset is more reliable and better defined, there are only two
periods of data so far, the years of 1995 and 2000. With this dataset we have 62 countries
covering both periods and 46 countries with only one period. Since this dataset consists
of only two periods and some countries only have one period data, we can only do
pooling cross-sectional analysis and include a time dummy variable to control for time
effect. 36 We use the central government and subnational government employee data in
this dataset to investigate the relative change of subnational government employment to
central government employment.
Table 1 presents the unweighted average of the central and subnational
government employees as a percentage of population for OECD and Non-OECD
countries at the years of 1995 and 2000 in our estimation, based on the World Bank
Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset. We find that both the unweighted averages
of the level of central and subnational government employees for all countries in our

35

Figure 2 is revised of Figure 1 of the World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset website:
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/crosschart.gif, accessed June 11, 2007.
36
Please refer to Appendix B. After adding in other control variables into the estimation, we have a sample
size of 57 observations.
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sample grow from 1995 to 2000. The level of central government employees as a
percentage of population for OECD countries is 1.81 in 1995 and 2.25 in 2000 while that
for non-OECD countries is 1.05 in 1995 and 1.21 in 2000. However, this is not the case
of subnational government employment. The average level of subnational government
employees as a percentage of population for OECD countries increases from 2.43 in 1995
to 3.01 in 2000 while that for non-OECD countries decreases from 0.74 in 1995 to 0.39
in 2000. Let us turn our attention to take a closer look to the difference in central and
subnational government employments between OECD and non-OECD countries. The
difference in the level central government employees as a percentage of population
between OECD and non-OECD countries is 0.76 in 1995 and 1.04 in 2000. Meanwhile,
the difference in the level of subnational government employees is quite significant and
the magnitude increases from 1.69 in 1995 to 2.62 in 2000. Figure 3 helps us to visually
understand this relative change of central and subnational government employment for
OECD and non-OECD countries in these two periods.
Since the determinants of public sector employment are likely to include its
domestic, either political or social, conditions, we are not able to capture this individual
effect by using a cross-sectional dataset. Therefore, we need a more complete dataset
covering more periods, which allows us to perform some econometric models to control
for the individual country effects. For our empirical work, we also adopt a dataset from
the International Labor Organization (ILO hereafter), or the International Labor
Organization Public Sector Dataset. The most important international concept of the
public sector is contained in the System of National Accounts (Hammouya, 1999). 37
According to which, the public sector is defined as all market or non-market activities
37

Please refer to Footnote 33.
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that are controlled and mainly financed by public authority. Public sector employment
comprises employees in the public sector, namely the general government sector and the
public corporation sector.
The ILO defines the general government employees as the employees in all
government units, social security funds and other nonprofit institutions that are controlled
and mainly financed by the public authority. It consists of:
(1) Employees in the government units. The government units carry out
government functions, and they include all bodies, departments, and establishments of
any level of government (central, state or provincial, local) which engage in
administration, defense, maintenance of public order, health, education and cultural,
recreational and other social services.
(2) Employees in the social security funds. The social security funds are social
insurance schemes covering large proportions or the whole of community, and are
imposed, controlled, and financed by government units. They can operate at each level of
government.
(3) Employees in the non-profit, non-market public or private institutions. The
non-profit institutions are legal entities which are autonomous from government units.
They are classified under the general government only if they are non-market, as well as
financed and controlled by the public authority.
The public corporation sector comprises all of the institutional units which
produce for the market and are controlled and mainly financed by public authority. Public
sector employees consist of the employees in the general government sector and the
public corporation sector. Figure 4 shows the components of public sector employment
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according to the ILO. 38
The International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset covers 108 countries
since 1985. 39 Before 1995, the data are available every five year. Since 1995, the data are
available every year. With the property of a panel dataset, we are able to explain the
difference of public sector employment across countries by controlling the individual
country effect. As we stated above, it does not make much sense to simply compare the
number of central government employees across countries without taking into account
that the central government in one country may perform many of the functions that in
another country are performed at the subnational government level. Our way of dealing
with this issue is to use the wider concepts of public sector, namely total public sector
employment, as suggested by Marinakis (1994), which makes the cross-country
comparisons more homogeneous. That is, we use the total public sector employee data of
this dataset as the dependent variable and try to find out what factors might explain the
variation of public sector employment across countries and over time.
Table 2 shows the unweighted average of total public sector employees as a
percentage of population of OECD and Non-OECD countries of the years of 1985, 1990,
1995, 2000, and 2005 in our estimation, based on the International Labor Organization
Public Sector Dataset. 40 From this table, we find that the average level of public sector
employment for OECD countries is higher than that for non-OECD countries in each
period. The average level of public sector employment for OECD countries is quite stable
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Figure 4 is a reconstructed version of Hammouya (1999).
The International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset website is http://laborsta.ilo.org/, accessed
June 11, 2007. The data have been revised in Appendix A. Please refer to Footnote 2.
40
For the purpose of comparing the data after 1995 to the data of the years of 1985, 1990, and 1995, we
calculate the 5-year average from 1996 to 2000 for the year of 2000. Since the dataset has the public sector
data up to 2004, the value of the year of 2005 is calculated by averaging four year data from 2001 to 2004.
39
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over time around 10 employees as a percentage of population but that for non-OECD
countries increases over time except for the period 1990-1995, which is 3.55 employees
as a percentage of population in 1985 and 7.99 in 2005. We also find that the difference
in average level of public sector employment between OECD and non-OECD countries is
decreasing over time, which is 7.07 employees as a percentage of population in 1985 and
1.75 in 2005. Figure 5 depicts the time trend of average level of public sector
employment for both OECD and non-OECD countries since 1985.

The Definition of Fiscal Decentralization

The second task is to define fiscal decentralization and how we measure it in
empirical analysis. Decentralization appears to be so widespread because there is often
confusion in the terminology (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 1997). Three varieties of
fiscal decentralization may be distinguished, corresponding to the degree of independent
decision-making exercised at the subnational government level (Bird & Vaillancourt,
1998).
First, what many governments call decentralization is the geographical
deconcentration of central government bureaucracy and service delivery. Deconcentration
means dispersion of responsibilities within a central government to regional branch
offices or subnational administrative units. This process of deconcentration increases
effectiveness and flexibility in the delivery of central government services by providing
service through regional or local offices of the central government, but it has nothing to
do with fiscal decentralization. Under deconcentration, decision-makers in the
subnational government level respond to central authorities but not to local constituencies.
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The second type of fiscal decentralization is delegation. The process of
decentralization by delegation is that the central government gives the subnational
governments the power to perform functions and to raise resources according to explicit
norms and rules with the understanding that these powers can be changed or revoked by
the central authorities. The degree of discretion in providing services and raising tax is
often constrained by central government rules. During the process of decentralization by
delegation the power remains within the central government. Thus the process of
decentralization by delegation may be better identified with unitary forms of government.
The third type of fiscal decentralization is devolution. Decentralization by
devolution is a process in which subnational governments have a more permanent right to
govern their own affairs with little meddling by the central authorities. In a devolved
system, subnational governments have their own-source revenues as well as discretion to
determine the mix of services.
The process of fiscal decentralization in our theoretical model, as discussed in
Chapter Three, is delegation since the subnational governor has the authority to decide
the level of public goods provided in this jurisdiction but the discretion to raise taxes is
limited. Now we need to explain how we measure fiscal decentralization. The measure of
decentralization used in most of the literature is the subnational share of total government
spending/revenue, among which we will use the subnational share of expenditure to
measure the degree of fiscal decentralization in the course of this research. MartinezVazquez and McNab (2003) and Bird (2000) have noted, among many others, that the
subnational share of total expenditures or revenues can be quite misleading. Nevertheless,
they use these conventional measures.
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Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) examine the accuracy of decentralization studies that use
the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFS hereafter) of the IMF by comparing
these results with those obtained from a more complete OECD dataset. They argue that
when using the subnational share of expenditures or revenues in empirical studies on
fiscal decentralization, some problems emerge. First, the GFS does not identify the
degree of subnational expenditure autonomy. Second, the GFS does not distinguish the
sources of tax and non-tax revenue, intergovernmental transfers, and other grants. Third,
the GFS does not disclose what proportion of intergovernmental transfers in conditional
as opposed to general-purpose, and whether transfers are distributed according to an
objective criteria or a discretionary measure. As a result of this limitation, the standard
measure of decentralization ends up being an overestimate of fiscal decentralization and
is far from being a perfect measure.
In spite of this, the GFS offers a wide range of data on expenditures and revenues
by function and economic type at all levels of government. Moreover, the GFS dataset
goes as far back as 1970 for some countries and also offers data for many developing
countries. In contrast, the OECD dataset suggested by Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) includes
only six countries and information for a period of only three years (1997-1999). 41
Internationally comparable data that provide this kind of information are not available
from other sources. Therefore, the GFS still constitutes the best source of data across
countries, and the subnational share of expenditure/revenue, despite its acknowledged
limitations, is still the best available measure of fiscal decentralization.
In this study, we measure fiscal decentralization as the subnational share of public
expenditure because we think the subnational share of revenue collection is not as good
41

These six countries are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
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an indicator. In most developing countries, for example, China, some tax revenues are
levied by the central government but mainly collected by the subnational government. As
a result, locally collected revenues are not allocated by the subnational governors and the
share of subnational government revenue over total revenue does not reflect the tax
autonomy of subnational governors (Zhang & Zou, 1998). In addition, according to our
theoretical model developed in Chapter Three, we use the share of subnational
government expenditure to explain the variation of public sector employment. Therefore,
the subnational government share of public expenditure is an appropriate measure of
fiscal decentralization in the context of our model. Taking these into account, we focus on
the expenditure side of fiscal decentralization, instead of the revenue side.
Table 3 is the unweighted average of subnational government shares of public
expenditure for OECD and Non-OECD countries of the years we use in our estimation.
We find that the average of subnational shares of expenditure for OECD countries is
higher than that for non-OECD countries in each period. The average of subnational
shares of total public expenditure for OECD countries in these five periods is 31.14%,
while that for non-OECD countries is 18.52%. The difference in subnational shares of
public expenditure between OECD and non-OECD countries is 12.34 percentage points
in 1985 and 16.74 in 2005. Figure 6 depicts the time trend of average of subnational
government share of public expenditure for both OECD and non-OECD countries since
1985.

The Empirical Hypotheses

The main purpose of this study is to analyze how fiscal decentralization policy
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affects the composition of the public sector employment, focusing on two of the most
important categories: central and subnational government employment. In particular, we
also want to find out the determinants of total public sector employment. We restate the
predictions of our theoretical model as follows:
Hypothesis One: There is a positive relationship between the degree of fiscal

decentralization and the subnational government employment. With a higher degree of
decentralization, the central government allocates more national resources to the
subnational level, which releases the subnational government budget constraint and
induces the subnational governor to hire more subnational government employees. We
use the World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset to test this hypothesis
since this dataset helps us to overcome the functional category problem, and therefore,
the data of the level of central government or subnational government employees as a
percentage of population of different countries are more reliable and comparable.
Hypothesis Two: The effect of fiscal decentralization on total public sector

employees depends on the magnitudes of two opposing effects: one is the reduction in
central government employment and the other one is the increase in subnational
government employment. If the amount of the reduction in central government
employment overwhelms the increase in the subnational government employment, total
public sector employment decreases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. This is on
line with the Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) Leviathan hypothesis if we measure the
government size as total public sector employees as a percentage of population. Most
studies of Leviathan hypothesis have focused on the growth of the share of government
expenditure as a share of GDP. However, growth in the public sector employees might
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constitute an equally valid alternative test of this hypothesis. In short, the Leviathan
model implies that the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of
fiscal decentralization, other things being equal.
On the other hand, if the amount of the increase in the subnational government
employment overwhelms the reduction in the central government employment, total
public sector employment increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. If this is
the case, we would support Oates (1972, 1985) and Wallis’ 42 point of view that the public
sector tends to be larger with more fiscal decentralization. We use the International Labor
Organization Public Sector Dataset to test this hypothesis, since this dataset has more
observations at cross-sectional and over-time dimensions. Moreover, there is no
functional category problem while comparing the level of total public sector employees
across countries and over time.
Hypothesis Three: We predict that the level of GDP per capita of a country is

positively correlated to the level of its subnational government employees. Given a fixed
tax rate, with a higher level of GDP per capita, the subnational governor has more
resources from the central government, which allows the subnational governor to hire
more employees, other things being equal. Hypothesis Three is in line with Wagner’s law,
which argues that economics development creates demand for new types of government
services, and the government sector needs more public employees to provide these
services. However, based on our theoretical model, this positive correlation does not exist
between GDP and central government employment. Consequently, the overall impact of
GDP on total public sector employment can not be determined a priori. We use both the
International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset and World Bank Public Sector
42

Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985).

56
Employment & Wage Dataset to test this hypothesis.
Hypothesis Four: We predict that the level of subnational government employees

increases with the proportion of political cost caused by negative subnational
governmental budget gap that is shifted to the central government, σ . 43 If the subnational
governor is able to shift the political cost of negative subnational budget gap to the
central executive easily, he is likely to hire more public employees to increase their utility
and ask the central government executive to pay part of the bill. In this case, the central
government executive has to transfer a larger proportion of resource to the subnational
governments to reduce the political cost of the negative subnational budget gaps. This
way reduces the public employees at the central government level. The impact of this
political variable on total public sector employment is ambiguous, due to these two
opposing effects. We use the World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset to
test the impact of the political variable on the relative change of public employment at the
central and subnational governments. Then we use the International Labor Organization
Public Sector Dataset to test the impact of this political variable on total public sector
employment.

The Political Variables

In our theoretical model, we introduce a political variable, σ , to measure the
ability of the subnational government to shift the political cost of the negative budget gap
occurred at the subnational government to the central government. The higher the value
of σ , the higher the ability of the subnational government to shift the political cost to the

43

We will discuss how we measure the ability of subnational governors to shift the political cost of
subnational government deficit to the central government in the next section.
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central government. In Chapter Three, we present an example that in some countries, like
Greece and Hungary, subnational governments do not have autonomous power in taxing
or spending and we expect that such subnational governors act like the agent of the
central executive. Therefore, the subnational governors in such countries can easily shift
its political cost of negative budget gap to the central government and bear less part of
political cost. On the other hand, the subnational governors in the other countries where
they have more autonomy in subnational government finance have to bear larger part of
political cost of the negative subnational government budget gap. As a result, we expect
that the level of subnational government employees of a country whose subnational
governors have more taxing and spending autonomy power is lower than that of a country
whose subnational governors have less taxing and spending autonomy power.
Empirically, there are no variable indicating the ability of the subnational
government to shift the political cost of the budget deficit occurred at the subnational
government to the central government executive. However, in the Database of Political
Institutions (DPI hereafter) of the World Bank, we find data that are able to capture the
autonomy power of the subnational governors.44 These data are represented by a dummy
variable, with a value equals to one if the state/provinces have authority over taxing,
spending or legislating and zero otherwise. The DPI covers most countries from 1975 to
2004. However, since this dataset only has 38% non-blank observations and it might not
be easy to simply divide countries into two groups, countries whose local governors have
autonomy over taxing, spending and legislating and countries whose local governors do
not have such autonomy, such a variable is not suitable for empirical analysis. In addition,
44

This dataset is available online at
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~
pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html, accessed June 11, 2007.
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taxing, spending and legislating are three very different things. It would be very desirable
to capture them with separate dummy variables. Moreover, an autonomy power is always
a matter of degree and not a matter of a closed question with a yes or a no answer.
Therefore, a simple dichotomy might be misleading.
Our solution to this shortcoming is to find a proxy variable to measure the degree
of autonomous power. We use the local election variable from the DPI to deal with this
issue. If a subnational governor is elected by local constituents, then we expect him to
have more autonomy power and more responsibility to the local public finance. Therefore,
if a negative subnational budget gap occurs in this jurisdiction, the locally elected
governor has to bear relatively greater part of the penalty from the negative budget gap.
This implies that we expect the level of subnational government employees of a country
which subnational governors are locally elected to be lower than that of a country which
subnational governors are appointed by the central government.
Based on the definition of DPI, the value of this variable equals zero if neither
subnational governor nor subnational legislature are locally elected, one if the subnational
governor is appointed but the legislature is elected, and two if both are locally elected.
The higher the value of this political dummy variable, the greater the responsibility of the
subnational governor to the subnational public finance is. Since the subnational governor
is more responsible to the subnational public finance, he will try to lower the negative
subnational budget gap as possible as he could, and, therefore, the level of subnational
government employment will be lower. This implies that we expect that the subnational
government employment level decreases with the value of this political dummy variable.
Our second political variable is also a dummy variable, which defines the
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constitutional relationship between the central and subnational governments of a country.
All the countries can be categorized into two groups: unitary and federal states. A unitary
state is a country which political power mainly controlled by the central government and
could be transferred or “delegated” to subnational government units. The central
government retains the principal right to recall such delegated power. Moreover, any
subnational government units in a unitary country can be created or abolished. As a result,
we expect that the central government in a unitary country controls over relatively more
resources of the country and provides relatively more public services to its residence than
that in a federal state.
Empirically, we expect that the level of central government employees in a
unitary country is higher than that in a federal. This dummy variable equals one if the
country is a unitary state and zero if it is a federal state. 45

The Empirical Issues
Estimated Equations

First, we want to know what factors cause the relative change of public sector
employment at subnational government level to central government level. That is, we
want to test the impact of fiscal decentralization, real GDP and the ability of the
subnational government to shift the political cost of negative subnational budget gap on
both the central and subnational government employments. To do this, we use the World
Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset to estimate the System of Equations
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The list of unitary states is available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_state, accessed June
11, 2007. Note that in many other issues of classification, this way can be misleading. For example, Spain
is a unitary country formally, but in practice, it operates more like federation than many formal federations.
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(14):
⎧CGEi = β10 + β11 ⋅ UNI i + β12 ⋅ Wi + β13 ⋅ YEARi + ε i ,1
⎨
⎩SGEi = β 20 + β 21 ⋅ DECi + β 22 ⋅ ELEi + β 23 ⋅ Wi + β 24 ⋅ YEARi + ε i , 2

(14)

where the dependent variables CGEi and SGEi are the level of central and subnational
government employees as a percentage of population in country i respectively. 46 The
variable DECi is a measure of the degree of fiscal decentralization, defined as the
subnational government share of public expenditure, in country i . UNI i is a dummy
variable, which equals one if this country is a unitary country and zero if this country is a
federal country. ELEi , a dummy variable with three values, 0, 1 and 2, is to measure the
responsibility of the subnational governor for subnational public finance. A country with
a higher value of ELEi means that the subnational governor in that country is more
responsible to subnational public finance than the subnational governor in a country with
a lower value of ELEi . Wi is a set of control variables which are standard in the
Leviathan literature, including a dummy for OECD countries, GDP per capita and the
degree of urbanization. We also include an index for openness, measured as the sum of
exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP, as suggested by Rodrik
(1996). Finally, we put the time dummy variable, YEARi , in our estimation model to
control for time effect, which equals one if the data is observed for the year of 2000 and
zero for the year of 1995.
In our theoretical model, since the degree of fiscal decentralization and central
government employment are jointly determined by the central executive, we should not

46

We will explain why we use the level of government employees as a percentage of population as our
dependent variable in the next section.
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include the fiscal decentralization variable, DECi , in the first estimating equation of the
System of Equations (14) to avoid the endogeneity problem. 47 Table 4 lists the definitions
of all variables in our model.
According to Hypothesis One, we expect the sign of the coefficient of fiscal
decentralization on subnational government employees, β 21 , to be positive. According to
Hypothesis Four, we expect the coefficient of the political variable, UNI i , to be positive
in the first estimation equation and the coefficient of the political variables, ELEi , to be
negative in the second equation of the System of Equations (14).
Second, we use the International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset to
test the impact of fiscal decentralization, GDP, and the political variable on total public
sector employment by estimating Equation (15):
PSEi ,t = β 0 + β1 ⋅ DECi ,t + β 2 ⋅ UNI i ,t + β 3 ⋅ ELEi ,t + β 4 ⋅ Wi ,t + ai + ε i ,t

(15)

where the dependent variable, PSEi ,t , is the level of total public sector employees as a
percentage of population in country i in year t . The independent variables, DECi ,t ,
measures the degree of fiscal decentralization in country i in year t ; UNI i ,t and ELEi ,t
are two political variables and Wi ,t is a set of control variables as we described above. ai
is the unobserved country effect, which can be thought of as omitted variables and is time
invariant within a country. Since the number of time periods is small relative to the
number of observation, we could include a dummy variable for each time period to
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We also suspect that the variables, subnational government employment, SGE , and degree of fiscal
decentralization, DEC , are likely to be simultaneously related, and we conduct the endogeneity test for
DEC before we estimate the System of Equations (14). We will discuss the endogeneity test later in this
chapter.
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account for secular changes that are not modeled. 48
Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan hypothesis argues that the size of the public
sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization, other things being
equal, which implies the sign of the coefficient on DECi ,t , or β1 , to be negative. 49
However, according to Oates and Wallis’ argument, the sign of β1 is expected to be
positive.
Wagner’s law argues that economic development creates demand for new types of
government services, which derives the public sector to hire more employees to provide
these services. Consequently, Wagner’s law expects the sign of coefficient of GDP per
capita in our control variable Wi ,t to be positive. However, our theoretical model only
shows that GDP per capita is positively correlated with the subnational government
employment level but not central government employment level.
In addition, according to Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995), we expect
government employment to be positively associated with the degree of urbanization,
since urbanization stimulates the demand for certain public services, which drives the
public sector to increase government employees. Moreover, according to Rodrik (1997),
the level of government employees increases with exposure to external risk since
relatively safe government jobs represent partial insurance against risk faced by the
domestic economy.

48

See, for example, Wooldridge (2000).
Most empirical studies that test for Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan hypothesis, as we discuss in
Chapter Two, measure the size of the public sector as the share of public expenditure on GDP, for example,
Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), Zax (1989), and Forbes and Zampelli (1989).
49

63
Description of the Data

To test our four hypotheses, we use two datasets: one is the World Bank Public
Sector Employment & Wage Dataset, which is an unbalanced panel dataset of 108

countries covering either the year of 1995 or 2000 or both, 50 and the other one is the
International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset, which is also an unbalanced

panel dataset covering 111 countries with the years of 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and
2005. 51 The data of fiscal decentralization are extracted from the Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook of the IMF for these years, which is defined as the subnational

government expenditure share of total public expenditure. The World Development
Indicators (WDI, 2005) is the source for the control variables including GDP per capita,

the degree of urbanization and the index of openness. Table 4 lists each variable with its
label, definition, and units of measurement. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of
the variables used on the empirical estimation of the System of Equations (14). Table 6
shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used on the empirical estimation of
estimation Equation (15).

Specification Issues of the Dependent Variables

In our theoretical model, we derive the relationship between public sector
employees and GDP. In practice, we divide both variables by population of the country.
That is, our dependent variable is the number of public sector employees as a percentage
of population and our independent variable that represents economic growth is GDP per
50

However, due to the limitation of other variables, the subnational government expenditure share and local
election variable, we only have a sample size of 57 observations in our estimation.
51
Again, after combining other independent variables, we have 41 countries covering various years. The
sample size for this estimation is 108.
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capita, which is used in almost all empirical studies, such as Tait and Heller (1984),
Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995), Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b) and Rama (1997).
In order to control the demographic characteristics of countries, we also use the
number of public employees as a percentage of labor force as the dependent variable,
which is used in Rama’s (1997) cross-country study and Marques-Sevillano and
Rossello-Villallonga’s (2004) case study on Spain.

Econometric Issues Related to Estimation of System of Equations (14)

Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model: In this section, we will introduce the

econometric methodology which we have applied to estimate our System of Equations
(14). Our goal is to find out the impact of the degree of fiscal decentralization and GDP
on subnational government employees as well as the impact of the ability of the
subnational governor to shift the political cost of negative subnational budget gap to the
central government executive on both central and subnational government employment.
We have two regression equations of interest in the System of Equations (14). However,
if we run the regression for each equation separately, we might find that the error terms of
each equation are correlated to each other. For example, if there are some factors that
affect both the dependent variables and are not in our control variables, we expect that the
error terms from these two regressions might be correlated.
In order to control for this, we employ the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR
hereafter) model, proposed by Zellner (1962). 52 The SUR model permits nonzero
covariance between the error terms ε i ,1 and ε i , 2 for a given individual country i across
52

For more detail discussion on SUR model, please refer to Appendix C or Section 15.4 of Greene (2000).

65
equations of the System of Equations (14), while assuming Cov(ε i ,1 , ε i ', 2 ) = 0 , where i '
represents any country other than country i . These two assumptions seem reasonable in
real world. For example, the effect of fiscal decentralization on the central government
employment in the United States affects that on the subnational government employment
in the United States; however, the effect of fiscal decentralization on the central
government employment in the United States is uncorrelated with that in China. This
potential nonzero covariance across these two equations allows for an improvement in
efficiency of the SUR model estimator relative to the OLS estimator. Moreover, the
greater the correlation of the residuals, the greater the efficiency gain accruing to SUR
model.
We report the estimation result of the System of Equations (14) by using SUR
model in the first two columns of Table 7. In addition, in order to illustrate the efficiency
gains of SUR model relative to OLS model, we report the OLS estimation result in the
next two columns of Table 7. We report the robust z-statistics of OLS estimators, which
are valid in the presence of heteroskedasticity in an unknown form.
Endogenous Variable: As we have mentioned above that the dependent variable

of the second equation of the System of Equations (14), SGEi ,t , and the dependent
variable, DECi ,t , are likely to be simultaneously correlated, we might have the
endogeneity problem in our estimation of the System of Equations (14). This endogeneity
problem arises from the correlation between the degree of fiscal decentralization and the
error term. If the endogeneity problem exists in our estimation model, then the estimators
will be biased. Thus, before we add this potential endogenous variable, the degree of
fiscal decentralization, in the model, we need to conduct an endogeneity test for it. Our
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endogeneity test follows the regression-based approach introduced by Wooldridge (2002).
To conduct the endogeneity test, we need to find a set of suitable instrument
variables (IV hereafter) for this potential endogenous variable. A suitable IV must be
uncorrelated with the error term and correlated with the endogenous variable in the model.
According to Panizza (1999), the degree of fiscal centralization is negatively correlated
with ethnic fractionalization. Empirically, three fractionalization indices are often used.
Besides ethnic fractionalization, there are linguistic and religious fractionalization indices
(Alesina et al., 2003). The fractionalization index is measured by the probability of two
randomly chosen individuals belonging to different groups and can be shown as:
N

Fractionalization Index = 1 − ∑ (
i =1

POPi
)
POPT

where POPN is total population and POPi is the number of people belonging to group i.
In our estimation, we use these three fractionalization indices as the IVs to test the
endogeneity of fiscal decentralization.
We start by estimating the reduced form of fiscal decentralization level using all
other independent variables in the estimation of the second equation of the System of
Equations (14) and three IVs as the independent variables. We obtain the residuals from
this estimation and then run the regression of our dependent variable in the estimation of
the second equation of the System of Equations (14) on all independent variables in the
equation as well as the residuals from the estimation of the reduced form equation. The
robust t-statistic of estimated coefficient of this error term is 1.45, with the corresponding
p-value of 0.15. This result implies that we are not able to reject the null that the

coefficient is zero at the conventional significance level. The insignificance of this
coefficient implies that the degree of fiscal decentralization is not an endogenous variable
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in our estimation model and, therefore, our estimators are unbiased. 53
Heteroskedasticity: If the residuals from the OLS or pooled OLS regression

model are not homoskedastic, or Var (ui ) ≠ σ ２ , the estimators are unbiased and consistent
but inefficient. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the OLS standard errors are no
longer valid for constructing confidence intervals and t statistics.
In our empirical work, we employ the White test to detect the heteroskedasticity. 54
We conduct the White test for heteroskedasticity for each equation of the System of
Equations (14). The White’s test statistic for the first equation in the system of equation
(14) is 52.80 with p-value of 0.33 and 33.00 with p-value of 0.42 for the second equation.
The result fails to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity assumption and,
therefore, we conclude that our empirical model of the System of Equations (14) satisfies
the homoskedasticity assumption.

Econometric Issues Related to the Estimation of Equation (15)

Endogenous Variable: Our estimation of Equation (15) is based on the equation of
m * = mc* + n ⋅ mi* (θ * , σ , n, R) . Since mc* and θ * are jointly determined by the central

government executive and m* consists of mc* and n ⋅ mi* , there might be an endogeneity
problem in the regression model of m* on θ * .
As we have mentioned in the case of the estimation of the System of Equations
(14), if there is an endogeneity problem in our estimation model, we would get biased
estimated coefficients. We conduct an endogeneity test for the indendent variable, degree
53
54

Please see Wooldridge (2002), Section 6.2, p118.
We have included more detail discussion of the heteroskedasticity test in Appendix D of this dissertation.
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of fiscal decentralization, which procedure is the same as what we have done for the
estimation of the second equation of the System of Equations (14). The robust t-statistic
of estimated coefficient of the error term from the estimation of the reduced form of fiscal
decentralization is 1.38 and we are not able to reject the null that the coefficient is zero at
the conventional significance level. The insignificance of this coefficient implies that the
degree of fiscal decentralization is not an endogenous variable in our estimation model
and, therefore, our estimators are unbiased.
Heteroskedasticity: Heteroskedasticity might be a problem in our estimation of

Equation (15), as we have discussed in the estimation of the System of Equations (14).
We pool our panel dataset and conduct the White’s test for heteroskedasticity. The
White’s test statistic is 93.72 and the corresponding p-value is 0.01. The result rejects the
null hypothesis that the residuals are homoskedastic. Therefore, we have
heteroskedasticity problem while estimating the Equation (15). In this case, our
estimators are still unbiased on consistent but inefficient. Moreover, the normal standard
errors are invalid for constructing confidence intervals and t-statistics. As a result, we
need to use the robust standard errors for conducting the statistical inference since they
are valid in the presence of any heteroskedasticity.
Individual Effects: Consider our estimation of Equation (15):
PSEi ,t = β 0 + β1 ⋅ DECi ,t + β 2 ⋅ UNI i ,t + β 3 ⋅ ELEi ,t + β 4 ⋅ Wi ,t + ai + ε i ,t

(15)

where ai are sometimes called an individual effect or individual heterogeneity, and the

ε i ,t are called the idiosyncratic errors. For simplicity, we rewrite Equation (15) as:
yi ,t = X i ,t ⋅ β + ui ,t

(16)

where yi ,t is our dependent variable, the level of public sector employees as a percentage
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of population of country i at time t and X i ,t includes a constant term and all our
dependent variables of country i at time t . u i ,t ≡ ai + ε i ,t are the composite errors. Under
the assumption that there is no correlation between X i ,t and ui ,t , the pooled OLS
estimator can be used to obtain a consistent estimator of β in estimation of Equation (16).
Ignoring the individual effects, the pooled OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent if the
individual effects are correlated with the dependent variables. If the individual effects are
uncorrelated with our dependent variables, ignoring the individual effects and applying
pooled OLS, the estimator might still be inefficient. This is because the composite errors
might be serially correlated due to the presence of individual effects in each time
period. 55 In our study, we apply fixed effects and random effects approaches to control
for the individual effects.
The decision of applying fixed effects model or random effects model depends on
whether or not the individual effects are correlated with our independent variables. The
random effects model assumes the individual effects are uncorrelated with the
independent variables. Hausman (1978) devises a specification test which can be used to
test the correlation of the individual effects and the independent variables, as we will
discuss in the following context.
Serial Correlation: To estimate Equation (15), we use the total public sector

employment data from the International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset. In
the dataset, we have five periods, with each period covering 5 years. 56 Since the data we
use in our regression model covers for 25 years, we suspect that serial correlation might

55
56

For more detail discussion of this part, please refer to Wooldridge (2002) Section 10.3.
Note that the data of the year 2005 covers only from the year 2000 to 2004.
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be a problem. If we ignore serial correlation and estimate the variance in the usual way,
the variance estimator will usually be biased when the parameter of the serial correlation
is not equal to zero.
The estimate of the first-order serial correlation, or AR(1), parameter, ρ , is
obtained by running the regression of ui ,t on ui ,t −1 without a constant. For each country i ,
we lose the first observation, that is, t = 2,3,..., T . The estimated serial correlation
coefficient, ρ̂ , is 0.275 with the robust t-statistics of 1.56 for our fixed effects and
random effects model. The insignificance of the serial correlation coefficient implies that
there is no serial correlation problem in our estimation model.
Testing Individual Effects versus Pooled OLS: As we have indicated before that

ignoring the individual effects, the pooled OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent if the
individual effects are correlated with the dependent variables. Under the assumption of
the individual effects being jointly equal to zero, the pooled OLS estimator is the best
linear unbiased estimator. Breusch and Pagan (1979) have derived a statistic using the
Lagrange multiplier in a likelihood setting to test the presence of individual effects, or
called the LM test. The null hypothesis of the absence of individual effects, statistically
equivalent to H 0 : σ a2 = 0 , is against the alternative hypothesis of the presence of
individual effects, or H1 : σ a2 ≠ 0 . Based on the residuals from the OLS estimation of
Equation (15), we obtain a Lagrange multiplier test statistic of 60.68, which far exceeds
the 99% critical value of chi-squared with one degree of freedom, 3.84. As a result, we
concluded that the pooled OLS regression model with a single constant term is
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inappropriate for our data. 57
Testing Fixed Effects versus Random Effects Estimators: The distinction between

fixed and random effects models is the assumption whether or not the individual effects
are correlated with the independent variables. Hausman (1978) test, based on the
difference between the random effects and fixed effects estimates, can be used to test the
correlation between the individual effects and the independent variables. Under the null
hypothesis of no correlation, both fixed effects and random effects estimates are
consistent, but fixed effects estimate is inefficient, whereas under the alternative
hypothesis, the fixed effects estimate is consistent, but the random effects estimate is not.
The Hausman statistic of our data is 33.06 and the corresponding p-value is closed
to zero. This result rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual
effects and independent variables, which implies that the random effects estimate is not
consistent and fixed effects model is appropriate. Based on the LM test, which is decisive
that there are individual effects, and the Hausman test, which suggest that these effects
are correlated with the other variables in the model, we would conclude that of these two
alternatives we have considered, the fixed effects model is the better choice. However, we
still report both results for comparison purposes. 58
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation: Besides the fixed

effects and random effects model estimation as discussed before, in this dissertation we
also employ the GMM method to estimate Equation (15). 59 The intuition of GMM is to
use the moment conditions that are assumed to be satisfied to minimize the GMM
objective function. Thus, we need to assume that the moment condition E ( X ' u ) = 0 in
57

For more detail of this test, please refer to Appendix F.
See Appendix G for more discussion of Hausman test.
59
For more detail discussion on the GMM approach, refer to Appendix H of this dissertation.
58
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Equation (16) is satisfied. In testing for the endogeneity of variable the degree of fiscal
decentralization, we have a set of three additional exogenous variables. Let Z be the set
of our exogenous variables, including the independent variables in Equation (16) and
three fractionalization index variables. Consequently, our moment condition can be
rewritten as E ( Z ' u ) = 0 .
Under the condition that there are no endogenous regressors in our regression
model and we have additional moment conditions, our efficient GMM estimator is that of
Cragg’s heteroskedasticity OLS. This estimator is more efficient than OLS in the
presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form and the efficiency gains drive from the
additional moment conditions (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1992). We report our GMM
estimation results in the third column of Table 8 and Table 9.
Spatial Dependency Tests: As indicated in Chapter One, policy makers may be

affected by neighboring country’s policies when they make their own policies due to the
presence of spatial effects. Spatial autocorrelation tests, as we introduce here, are used to
measure the degree of dependence among observations in a given geographic space.
Currently, several statistics measuring the extent of spatial autocorrelation are available;
among these, Moran’s I and Getis and Ord’s G statistic are the most commonly used
statistics (Florax & van der Vlist, 2003). 60 In this dissertation, we use these two statistics
to detect the spatial effects in our dataset.
Before conducting the spatial dependency test, we need to define an appropriate
weight matrix to quantify the structure of spatial dependence between observations. We
category all the countries in our dataset into six groups: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and

60

See Appendix I for more detail about these two spatial dependency tests.
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former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa,
and OECD. Due to the similarities in political and social-economic background of
countries within each group, we expect that spatial effects are more likely to exist within
groups than between groups. Based on this spatial configuration, our spatial weight
matrix, M, takes the form:
⎡ 0 L M 1n ⎤
M = ⎢⎢ M O M ⎥⎥ ,
⎢⎣ M n1 L 0 ⎥⎦

where n is the number of observations. All the elements of the diagonal of M are zero.
M ij = 1 , ∀i ≠ j , if country i and country j are in the same group; otherwise, M ij = 0 .

The Moran’s I statistic for our sample is 17.14; meanwhile, the Getis and Ord’s G
statistic is 5.13. Both statistics are significant at 1% significance level. This result
implies that spatial effects within groups are significantly present. This also confirms
both previous cross country spatial analysis studies of Redoano (2003) and (MbakileMoloi (2006).
Estimation Results
Estimation Results of the System of Equations (14)

In this section we present our estimation results of the System of Equations (14).
The first two columns in Table 7 show the regression results for the System of Equations
(14) by applying the SUR estimation. As indicated before, the efficiency gains of SUR
estimation over OLS estimation comes from allowing the nonzero covariance between
residuals from both equations. To illustrate this, we also report the estimation result by
using OLS and put these two results together for easy comparison. The correlation of the
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residuals from two equations in the System of Equations (14) is 0.12.
The purpose of the estimation of the System of Equation (14) is to find out how
fiscal decentralization policy and the political variables influence the relative change in
subnational government employment compared to the change in central government
employment. From Table 7 we can see that the coefficient on fiscal decentralization is
positive at 1% significance level. The significant positive result implies that the level of
subantional government employees as a percentage of population increases with the
degree of fiscal decentralization, other things being equal. As we have stated in the
previous chapter, a higher degree of fiscal decentralization means that more resources go
to the subnational government, which allows the subnational governor to hire more
employees. This finding confirms Wallis’s 61 hypothesis that the subnational government
tends to be larger with the extent of fiscal decentralization since individuals with more
control over public decisions at the subnational level than at the national level may
empower the subnational governments with more responsibilities and functions. This
result also confirms Marques-Sevillano and Rossello-Villallonga’s (2004) study of the
Spanish case. They find that in Spanish economy the regional governments that have
received larger degrees of responsibilities from the central government are the ones that
have higher levels of public employees during the period 1990-1999.
For the political variables, we expect that the level of central government
employees is higher in a unitary country. This is because the central government in a
unitary country has direct authority over the subnational governments and control over
most resource of the country, which allows the central executive to hire more public
employees. We also predict that the level of subnational government employees is lower
61

Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985).
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in a country which subnational governors are elected by local residences. This is because
the subnational governor who are elected locally are more responsible to the subnational
public finance and have to bear greater proportion of the cost of the negative subnational
government budget gaps than the governors who are appointed by the central government
since they can easily shift the cost to the central executive. As a result, the elected
subnational governors do not allow a negative budget gap to occur or seek to lower the
gap. Based on this argument, we expect that the level of subnational government
employees is lower in a country which subnational governors are elected. To sum up, the
level of public employees at the central government level tends to be higher in a unitary
constitutional system; on the contrary, the level of public employees at the subnational
government level is lower in the countries which subnational governors are elected
locally.
Our SUR estimation of the coefficients of these political variables in the System
of Equations (14) shows that the level of central government employees in a unitary state
indeed is higher than that in a federal country by 0.86 employees per 100 people at 1%
significant level. This result confirms our prediction that a unitary country has higher
level of central government employees than a federal country does. Our result also shows
that the level of subnational government employees is lower in a country which both
subnational governors and legislatures are elected than that in a country which the
subnational governors are appointed but the legislatures are elected by 0.9 employees per
100 people. This amount doubles when we compare to a country which both subnational
governors and legislatures are appointed by the central government, other things being
equal.
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Among the other control variables, we find that the level of GDP per capita is
positively correlated to both the levels of central government and subnational government
employees as a percentage of population at 1% significant level, which confirms
Wagner’s law that economic development creates demand for new types of government
services. We also find that the level of central government employees tends to be higher
in a more opened country. The openness of a country is defined as the ratio of the sum of
the country’s imports and exports of goods and services on GDP. This finding confirms
Rodrik’s (1996, 1997) and Rama’s (1997) arguments that relatively safe government jobs
represent partial insurance against undiversifiable external risk faced by the domestic
economy.
By comparing the estimation results of SUR approach to OLS approach, we find
that these two results are quite the same, except for the significance level. Our estimation
result of the System of Equations (14) tells us that the level of subnational government
employees as a percentage of population increase with the degree of fiscal
decentralization and tend to be lower in the country which both subnational governors
and legislatures are elected while the level of central government employees as a
percentage of population is higher in unitary countries. As we have stated in Chapter One,
the variation of public sector employment could be defined in three dimensions: time
series, cross section, and structural dimensions. The estimation of the System of
Equations (14) explains what factors might have caused the structural change of public
sector employment. In the next section, we will discuss the empirical results that explain
the variation of public sector employment in time series and cross section dimensions.
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Estimation Results of the Equations (15)

Table 8 and Table 9 list our estimation results of Equation (15). The dependent
variable in Table 8 is the level of public sector employees as a percentage of population.
Since the demographic characteristics might vary across countries, in order to control
over this, we also estimate the determinant of the level of public sector employees as a
percentage of labor force and report the result in Table 9. The first and second columns in
Table 8 and Table 9 are the estimation results by applying fixed effects and random
effects approaches respectively. The third column is the estimation result by employing
the GMM approach. The quantity in parenthesis is the absolute value of robust z-statistics,
which is valid in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in unknown
form.
First, we discuss the results of fixed effects and random effects models. The
Hausman test helps us choose the appropriate model from fixed effects and random
effects models. The Hausman statistic of our data is 33.06, which corresponding p-value
is closed to zero. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the
individual effects and other independent variables in the model, which indicates that the
random effects estimate is inconsistent and the fixed effects model is the better choice. In
the following discussion, we will focus on the fixed effects model.
Our Hypothesis Two suggests that fiscal decentralization plays an important role
in the determination of total public sector employment but our theoretical model does not
give us an explicit relationship between these two variables since it depends on two
opposing effects. From our fixed effects model estimation, we are not able to conclude
whether fiscal decentralization is positively or negatively related to the level of total
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public sector employees as a percentage of population. Except for the coefficients of the
time dummies, the only significant coefficient in fixed effects model is that on local
election. However, this coefficient is not significant in the other two models.
As we have mentioned previously, our GMM estimation is more efficient due to
three additional moment conditions. Indeed, our GMM estimators are more significant
than fixed effects estimators, referring to the Table 8 and Table 9. The GMM estimation
result shows that the degree of fiscal decentralization has a positive and significant effect
on the level of public employees as a percentage of population at 5% significance level,
as reported in Table 8. The magnitude of this coefficient is 0.141, which implies that a ten
percentage point increase in the subnational government share of public expenditure
results in an increase of 1.41 public employees, all else being equal. This finding supports
the argument of Oates (1972, 1985) and Wallis 62 but based on different explanations.
Oates (1972, 1985) argues that highly decentralization may lose certain economies of
scale which makes the public sector have to increase the employee level. Wallis argues
that in a highly decentralized government, individuals have more control over public
decisions at the subnational government level than at the central government level, and
they will wish to empower the public sector with a wider range of functions and
responsibilities carried out at more localized levels of government. In our theoretical
model, we predict that fiscal decentralization policy drives the increase in the subnational
government employment and restrains the growth of central government employment.
Our empirical result shows that the magnitude of the increase in the subnational
government employment is greater than that of the reduction in the central government
employment. As a result, total pubic sector employment increases with the degree of
62

Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985).
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fiscal decentralization.
We turn our attention to the coefficient on GDP per capita, which is insignificant.
Based on our theoretical model, we expected that the subnational government
employment increases with GDP but the central government employment might increase
or decrease with it. From the estimation result of the System of Equations (14), we know
that both the levels of central and subnational government employees as a percentage of
population increase with GDP per capita. 63 But why is the impact of GDP on total public
sector employment insignificant in the estimation of Equations (15)? There might be two
explanations to the insignificant nature of the coefficient for GDP per capita. First, in the
estimation of the System of Equations (14), we use the dataset from the World Bank
Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset while we are using the ILO Public Sector
Dataset to estimate the Equation (15). These two datasets cover different countries and

periods and, therefore, we can have different results. Second, the definition of total public
sector employment we used in the estimation of Equation (15) consists of seven
categories: except for employees at the central and subnational governments, it includes
employees in education, health, police, armed forces and public enterprises. It must be
that public employees in at least one of these categories decrease with GDP per capita
and, therefore, total public sector employment is not increasing with it. However, due to
the limitation of our data, we are not able to find out which category of public sector
employment that decreases with GDP per capita explicitly.
Among the control variables, we find that the degree of urbanization is positively
correlated with the level of total public sector employees as a percentage of population.
This result is consistent with Kraay and van Rijckeghem’s (1995) finding. These authors
63

Please refer to Table 7.
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argue that urbanization stimulates the demand for certain pubic services, such as
infrastructure, social order etc., which drives the public sector to hire more employees.
Regarding the determinants of the level of public sector employees as a
percentage of labor force, we find that the estimation results in Table 9 are quite
consistent with those in Table 8. All significant coefficients in the estimation of public
sector employment as a percentage of population are still significant in the estimation of
public sector employment as a percentage of labor force with the same sign. The only
difference is that the coefficient for the openness index, measured by the sum of exports
and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP, is positively significant at 5% level.
This finding is in line with Rodrik’s (1996, 1997) argument that relative safe government
jobs represent partial insurance against external risk faced by the domestic economy.
The estimation results for the System of Equations (14) explain the structural
change of the public sector employment. Fiscal decentralization policy shifts the central
government employees to the subnational level, and, therefore, causes the structural
change in public sector employment. The estimation result for Equation (15) explains the
differences in the levels of total public sector employment as a percentage of population
and labor forces across countries and over time. The degree of fiscal decentralization,
political constitution, the degree of urbanization and the openness of the country help us
to explain this variation. The level of total public sector employees as a percentage of
population is higher in a unitary country and increases with extent of fiscal
decentralization, as well as the degree of urbanization and the exposure to risk. The
estimates for Equation (15) help explain why the level of total public sector employees as
a percentage of population increases in some countries but decreases in the others during

81
the period between 1985 and 2005. They also explain why the level of total public sector
employees as a percentage of population in some countries is higher or lower than that in
the others at a given point of time.
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Figure 2: The Main Components of Public Sector Employment
According to World Bank
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Figure 3: The Unweighted Average Level of Central and Subnational Government
Employees for OECD and non-OECD Countries in 1995 and 2000
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Figure 4: The Main Components of Public Sector Employment According to ILO
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Figure 5: Time Trend of the Unweighted Averages of the Levels of Total Public
Sector Employees as a Percentage of Population
for OECD and non-OECD Countries
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Figure 6: Time Trend of the Unweighted Averages of the Subnational Shares on
Public Expenditure for OECD and non-OECD Countries
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Table 1: The Unweighted Averages of the Levels of Central and Subnational
Government Employees as a Percentage of Population for OECD and Non-OECD
Countries for 1995 and 2000
1995
2000
Central
Subnational
Central
Subnational
Government
Government
Government
Government
Country
Employees
Employees
Employees
Employees
OECD Countries
1.81
2.43
2.25
3.01
(20)
(20)
(15)
(15)
Non-OECD Countries
1.05
0.74
1.21
0.39
(13)
(13)
(9)
(9)
All Sample
1.51
1.76
1.86
2.03
(33)
(33)
(24)
(24)
The quantities in (.) are the number of observations.
Source: World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset and Schiavo-Campo et al.
(1997b).

Table 2: The Unweighted Averages of the Levels of Total Public Sector Employment
as a Percentage of Population for OECD and Non-OECD Countries
Country

1985
1990
1995 2000*
2005*
10.62 10.18
9.71
10.09
9.74
(9)
(10)
(17)
(20)
(8)
Non-OECD Countries
3.55
8.40
6.14
6.91
7.99
(4)
(7)
(11)
(15)
(7)
All Sample
8.44
9.45
8.31
8.73
8.93
(13)
(17)
(28)
(35)
(15)
The quantities in (.) are the number of observations.
* The observation of the year 2000 is obtained as the follows: calculate the 5year average from 1996 to 2000 for each country, and then calculate the
unweighted average of all countries in the group. The observation of the year
2005 is obtained by the same way as the year 2000, except for using the data
from 2001 to 2004.
Source: International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset.
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Table 3: The Unweighted Averages of the Subnational Government Shares on Public
Expenditure for OECD and Non-OECD Countries
Country
OECD Countries

1985*
1990*
1995*
2000*
2005*
35.96
31.36
29.99
28.20
30.19
(9)
(10)
(17)
(20)
(8)
Non-OECD Countries
23.63
18.79
16.39
20.33
13.46
(4)
(7)
(11)
(15)
(7)
All Sample
32.17
26.18
24.64
24.83
22.38
(13)
(17)
(28)
(35)
(15)
The quantities in (.) are the number of observations.
* These observations are obtained as the follows: calculate the 5-year average of the previous
five years for each country, and then calculate the unweighted average of all countries in the
group.
Source: The Government Finance Statistics of the IMF.
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Table 4: Description of Variables
Variable

Label

Definition

Units

Central Government
Employees

CGE

Central Government
Employees as % of
Population

%

Subnational Government
Employees

SGE

Subnational Government
Employees as % of
Population

%

Public Sector Employees

PSE

Fiscal Decentralization

DEC

Unitary Country

UNI

Local Election

ELE

OECD Country

OECD

GDP per capita

GDPPC

Openness

TRADE

Urbanization Ratio

URB

Total Public Sector
Employees as % of
Population
Share of Subnational
Government Expenditure
on Public Expenditure
1 for Unitary Countries

%

%

Source
World Bank Public Sector
Employment & Wage
Dataset Website*, and
Schiavo-Campo et al.
(1997b)
World Bank Public Sector
Employment & Wage
Dataset Website*, and
Schiavo-Campo et al.
(1997b)
International Labor
Organization Public Sector
Dataset Website**
The Government Finance
Statistics of the IMF

0/1 Internet***

0 if neither local governor
nor local legislature are
The Database of Political
locally elected, 1 if the
0/1/2
Institutions of the World
local governor is appointed
Bank****
but the legislature is
elected and 2 if both are
locally elected.
1 for OECD Countries
0/1 OECD Website*****
World Development
Constant 2000 US$
1,000
Indicators (2005)
Sum of Exports and
Imports of Goods and
World Development
%
Services Measured as a
Indicators****** (2005)
Share of GDP
Share of Urban Population
on Population

%

World Development
Indicators****** (2005)

* http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/, accessed June 11, 2007
** http://laborsta.ilo.org/, accessed June 11, 2007
*** http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_state, accessed June 11, 2007
****http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649
465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html, accessed June 11, 2007
***** http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed
June 11, 2007
****** Variables which resource is the World Development Indicators have the definition provided by the
World Bank.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation of the System of Equations (14)
Number of
Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

57

1.66

1.27

0.05

5.27

57

1.87

2.09

0.20

10.14

Fiscal Decentralization

57

24.81

13.47

5.43

57.43

GDP per capita

57

14.76

9.16

1.82

32.52

Openness

57

66.98

34.12

16.51

167.98

Degree of Urbanization

57

65.92

17.48

26.17

96.62

Variable
Central Government
Employees (% of Population)
Subnational Government
Employees (% of Population)

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Equation (15)
Number of
Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Public Sector Employees
(% of Population)

108

8.73

5.29

0.90

34.31

Public Sector Employees
(% of Labor Force)

108

18.55

10.33

2.04

72.72

Fiscal Decentralization

108

25.54

14.76

2.41

59.02

GDP per capita

108

14.72

9.32

0.67

34.84

Openness

108

71.65

40.49

14.04

204.67

Degree of Urbanization

108

64.84

18.98

15.53

96.98

Variable
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Table 7: Estimated Coefficients on Central and Subnational Government
Employment

Expenditure Decentralization

Unitary Country

SUR Approach
Central
Subnational
Government
Government
Employees (as
Employees (as
% of
% of
Population)
Population)
0.054
(2.82)**

OLS Approach
Central
Subnational
Government
Government
Employees (as Employees (as
% of
% of
Population)
Population)
0.055
(2.16)*

0.860
(2.81)**

-

0.916
(3.16)**

-

Local Election

-

-0.901
(3.00)**

-

-0.902
(2.18)*

OECD Country

-0.274
(0.61)

-0.156
(0.24)

-0.279
(0.55)

-0.154
(0.32)

GDP per capita

0.080
(3.04)**

0.125
(3.06)**

0.080
(2.72)**

0.124
(3.45)**

Openness

0.008
(2.02)*

-0.001
(0.11)

0.008
(1.55)

-0.001
(0.11)

Degree of Urbanization

0.001
(0.05)

0.019
(1.24)

0.001
(0.07)

0.019
(1.48)

Constant

-0.605
(0.91)

-1.407
(1.37)

-0.652
(1.14)

-1.427
(1.37)

Observations
57
57
57
57
R-squared
0.39
0.54
Absolute value of z statistics is given in parentheses; for OLS estimators, robust z-statistics is given.
In each regression model we include a time dummy, but we do not report the coefficients on that dummy.
* and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level respectively.
The correlation of residuals from SUR model is 0.12.
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Table 8: Estimated Coefficients on Total Public Sector Employment

Expenditure Decentralization

Unitary Country

Dependent Variable: Total Public Sector Employees
as % of Population
Fixed Effects Model
Random Effects Model
GMM Approach
0.015
0.015
0.141
(0.18)
(0.18)
(2.22)*
-

5.115
(3.48)**

4.453
(3.17)**

Local Election

2.468
(3.91)**

1.619
(1.22)

-0.430
(0.30)

OECD Country

-

-1.685
(0.50)

1.198
(0.53)

GDP per capita

0.543
(1.29)

0.276
(1.34)

-0.001
(0.01)

Openness

0.011
(0.41)

0.019
(1.27)

0.030
(1.83)

Degree of Urbanization

0.267
(1.30)

0.007
(0.16)

0.088
(2.24)*

-16.878
(1.10)

0.146
(0.04)

-5.780
(1.86)

Constant

Observations
108
108
108
Number of countries
41
41
R-squared
0.38
Absolute value of robust t-statistics is given in parentheses.
In each regression model we include a set of time dummies, but we do not report the coefficients on those
dummies.
* and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level respectively.
The estimated serial correlation coefficient for Fixed Effects and Random Effects models is 0.275.
The instrumental variables used in the GMM are ethnic, language and religion fractionalization indices.
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Table 9: Estimated Coefficients on Total Public Sector Employment

Expenditure Decentralization

Unitary Country

Dependent Variable: Total Public Sector Employees
as % of Labor Force
Fixed Effects Model
Random Effects Model
GMM Approach
-0.057
-0.037
0.236
(0.36)
(0.22)
(1.97)*
0.000
(.)

9.413
(3.34)**

8.397
(2.80)**

Local Election

4.586
(3.76)**

3.570
(1.34)

-0.749
(0.27)

OECD Country

0.000
(.)

-2.094
(0.31)

4.425
(1.00)

GDP per capita

0.983
(1.05)

0.441
(1.07)

-0.180
(0.77)

Openness

0.018
(0.34)

0.038
(1.20)

0.068
(2.18)*

Degree of Urbanization

0.287
(0.75)

0.013
(0.14)

0.205
(2.80)**

-12.712
(0.43)

4.465
(0.55)

-9.704
(1.60)

Constant

Observations
108
108
108
Number of Countries
41
41
R-squared
0.38
Absolute value of robust t-statistics is given in parentheses.
In each regression model we include a set of time dummies, but we do not report the coefficients on
those dummies.
* and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level respectively.
The estimated serial correlation coefficient for Fixed Effects and Random Effects models is 0.212.
The instrumental variables used in the GMM are ethnic, language and religion fractionalization indices.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation seeks to investigate the relationship between public sector
employment and fiscal decentralization. We develop a theoretical model that helps us
understand the interaction of the central executive’s and subnational governor’s decisions
on the level of public employees at the central and subnational levels. Our empirical work
shows that fiscal decentralization policy shifts central government employees to the
subnational government level and that the increase in public employees at the subnational
government level overwhelms the decrease in public employees at the central level. As a
result, the level of total public sector employees increases with the degree of fiscal
decentralization of a country. We also find that the levels of total public sector employees
as a percentage of population are higher in unitary country systems than those in federal
countries. The level of public employment also increases with the degree of urbanization
and with the exposure to risk of a country.
In Chapter Two, we review the literature on this topic. First, we present three
hypotheses that explain the variation of public sector employment across countries and
over time. We also examine studies that relate to the determinants of public sector
employment. However, we argue that most previous studies have ignored the structural
change in public sector employment that may be generated by fiscal decentralization.
Then, we review two different view points on the relationship between decentralization
and public sector size, as measured by the ratio of public expenditure or revenue over
GDP. From our literature review we find that despite the growing literature on fiscal
decentralization issues, there has been so far little theoretical or empirical work done on
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the impact of fiscal decentralization on public sector employment. In addition, we also
review two prior studies indicating the existence of spatial effects in the determination of
fiscal policies on the expenditure of the budget.
In Chapter Three, we develop a two-player-two-period model that allows us to
investigate the interaction between the central executive’s and the subnational governor’s
decisions on the amount of public employees at both government levels. The theoretical
model yields four hypotheses: first, higher degrees of fiscal decentralization are
associated with higher levels of subnational government employment; second, total
public sector employment is a function of the degree of fiscal decentralization but the
direction is ambiguous, depending on two opposing effects; third, higher levels of GDP
per capita are associated with higher levels of subnational government employment;
finally, the level of subnational government employees is positively correlated with the
ability of the subnational governors to shift the political cost caused from negative
subnational budget gaps to the central executive. An important contribution of this
dissertation is that we incorporate the production function of public goods into both the
central executive’s and subnational governor’s utility function. Within this framework,
we are able to investigate the interaction of decisions on the level of public employees at
both the central and subnational governments. The level of total public sector employees
can be further expressed as a function of the degree of fiscal decentralization, which our
empirical study is based on.
In Chapter Four, we conduct an empirical analysis to test the hypotheses drawn
from our theoretical model. We use the SUR methodology and the World Bank Public
Sector Employment & Wage Dataset for 38 OECD and non-OECD countries in either
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1995 or 2000 or both periods to examine the determinant of central and subnational
government employment and to investigate the change in subnational government
employment relative to the change in central government employment. As a second stage
of our empirical estimation, we use the fixed effects and random effects approaches and
the International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset for 41 OECD and nonOECD countries over the period from 1985 to 2005 to examine the determinants of the
levels of total public sector employees as a percentage of population and labor force.
While testing our hypotheses, we find evidence of heteroskedasticity on the residuals.
Therefore, in our result tables, we report the robust standard error, which is valid under
the condition of heteroskedasticity in an unknown form. We further employ the GMM
method with three additional moment conditions in an attempt to improve the estimating
efficiency. Our GMM estimators are also valid in the presence of any heteroskedasticity
or serial correlation.
With fiscal decentralization policy, the central government transfers some
expenditure responsibilities to the subnational governments, which drives the level of
subnational government employees up. Our SUR estimation results confirm this
hypothesis. We also find that the level of central government employees is higher in a
unitary country than in a country with federalism constitution. This may be because in a
unitary country the central government has direct authority over the subnational
governments and control over most resource of the country, which allows the central
executive to hire more public employees. Our empirical results also indicate that the level
of subnational government employees is lower in a country whose subnational governor
and legislature are elected locally than that in a country whose subnational governor and
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legislature are appointed by the central government. This would be because locally
elected governors take more direct responsibility for the negative subnational budget gap
than governors appointed by the central government.
In terms of the level of total public sector employment, the empirical results of
GMM approach show that it increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. This is
somewhat a surprising result. Typically, more public employment is associated with an
excessive number of public sector employees, and, therefore, with unproductive spending.
On the other hand, fiscal decentralization policy has been generally thought to result in an
increase in allocative efficiency, since a decision on public expenditures made by a level
of government that is closer and more responsive to a local constituency is more likely to
reflect the demand for local services than a decision made by a remote central
government. In addition, decentralization has been thought as having the potential of
improving competition among governments and of facilitating technical innovations.
Therefore, one might expect that fiscal decentralization should help to retrench the public
sector employment. However, from our empirical result, we find that subnational
governors without taking full responsibility for subnational public finance tends to bloat
the levels of subnational government employees and ask the central government to pay
the bill. As a result, the level of total public sector employees increases with fiscal
decentralization policy. These findings are much in line with Oates’ (1972, 1985) and
Wallis’ 64 anticipated results, but they are based on different explanations.
Among the control variables, we find that the levels of total public sector
employees as a percentage of population are higher in unitary countries than those in
federal countries. Also, consistent with Kraay and van Rijckeghem’s (1995) study, we
64

Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985).
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find that the level of public sector employees increases with the degree of urbanization.
To capture the demographic character of our variable of interest, public
employment, we also estimate the determinants of the level of public sector employees as
a percentage of labor force. The results from this estimation are quite consistent with
those found with the level of public sector employees as a percentage of population as the
dependent variable. The only difference is that in this estimation the coefficient of the
openness index is significantly positive at 5% level. This finding supports Rodrik’s (1997)
argument that government jobs represent a partial insurance against external risks faced
by the country.
Employing the two most commonly used spatial dependency tests, Moran’s I and
Getis and Ord’s G statistics, we also find evidence of spatial dependency in terms of the
level of public sector employees as a percentage of population among the countries in our
dataset. Even though from the spatial dependency test, we are not able to see how the
spatial effects affect the decision makers in making their policies. However, this finding
suggests that while using country’s own domestic variables to explain the level of public
sector employment, we should not ignore that the neighboring countries’ policies also
play an important role in determining it.

APPENDIX A: TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
Total Public Sector Employees (as % of Population)
Year
Group
1985
1990
1995
2000
Albania
ECA
8.58
6.96
Argentina
LAC
3.55
Australia
OECD
10.8
10.54
8.74
8.05
Belgium
OECD
9.13
9.62
10.08
10.23
Bolivia
LAC
2.81
2.63
Brazil
LAC
5.22
5.01
4.65
Bulgaria
ECA
15.24
Canada
OECD
11
11.23
10.27
9.24
Chile
LAC
3.33
Colombia
LAC
1.07
Costa Rica
LAC
Croatia
ECA
15.77
Czech Republic
ECA
10.82
Denmark
OECD
17.71
Dominican Republic
LAC
3.76
4.29
Ethiopia
AF
Finland
OECD
13.87
14.34
10.84
11.03
France
OECD
8.25
Germany
OECD
8.79
Hungary
ECA
7.92
9.26
India
AS
2.35
2.3
2.19
1.98
Ireland
OECD
7.73
7.88
7.6
Italy
OECD
6.44
6.18
Lithuania
ECA
14.76
Malaysia
AS
4.76
4.12
3.47
3.26
Mexico
LAC
5.85
5.22
4.95
Netherlands
OECD
9.63
9.81
New Zealand
OECD
Norway
OECD
18.52
19.02
Panama
LAC
5.93
5.77
Poland
ECA
14.45
11.94
Romania
ECA
34.31
24.54
17.78
Slovak Republic
ECA
13.39
South Africa
AF
4.42
4.13
Spain
OECD
4.71
5.44
5.68
5.91
Sweden
OECD
19.55
19.55
14.48
13.96
Switzerland
OECD
8.41
9.36
8.38
Thailand
AS
3.28
3.49
4.26
4.28
United Kingdom
OECD
11.06
10.05
9.25
8.88
United States
OECD
7.01
7.48
7.48
7.27
Zimbabwe
AF
3.8
3.43
2.76
Source: International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset Website, http://laborsta.ilo.org/,
accessed June 11, 2007.
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2005

7.42

9.66
9.14

5.3
12.51

0.9

8.5

12.68

5.97
18.87
9.35
10.52
10.72

7.97
4.37

APPENDIX B: CENTRAL AND SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Central and Subnational Government Employees (as % of Population)
1995
Central
Government
Employees
1.9
0.9
1.3
1.7
1.2
0.31
0.9
1
0.3

2000
Subnational
Government
Employees
0.2
2.8
2.3
2.3
0.2
1.26
0.3
1.8
0.2

Central
Government
Employees
0.05

Subnational
Government
Employees
0.2

Country
Albania
Argentina
Australia
0.8
2.08
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
0.38
0.38
Canada
1.09
2.06
Chile
0.82
0.2
Colombia
4.99
0.49
Croatia
1.6
0.6
1.88
0.43
Czech Republic
4.76
2.32
Denmark
2.8
5.2
3.12
10.14
Finland
2.2
7.7
2.4
8.07
France
2.7
2.2
3.59
2.37
Germany
0.4
2.6
Hungary
1.4
1.3
1.46
1.56
India
0.4
0.4
0.28
0.56
Indonesia
0.7
0.3
0.74
0.23
Ireland
1.2
0.8
5.27
0.71
Italy
1.3
1.3
3.43
2.49
Lithuania
1.26
0.49
Malaysia
2.3
1.1
Mexico
1.7
1.72
0.68
0.72
Netherlands
3.9
1.3
Norway
2.6
1.6
Poland
0.2
0.4
0.42
0.29
Portugal
1.8
0.8
Romania
0.51
0.51
Slovak Republic
0.46
0.33
South Africa
1.4
1.1
Spain
1.3
2
2.3
2.81
Sweden
4.1
5.3
Switzerland
2.1
2.5
Thailand
1.2
0.9
United Kingdom
1.3
2.2
3.06
3.37
United States
1.2
3.2
0.97
5.9
Zimbabwe
0.6
0.2
Source: Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore, Giulio de Tommaso and Amitabha Mukherjee, "An International
Statistical Survey of Government Employment and Pay," World Bank Working Paper: 1771, and World
Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset Website, http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/,
accessed June 11, 2007.
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APPENDIX C: THE SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION MODEL

In this appendix, we cover the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model as
we have applied in the estimation of the System of Equations (14). 65 The SUR model can
be viewed as a special case of the generalized regression model, and can be showed as:
yi , j = X 'i , j ⋅β j + ε i , j ,

i = 1,..., N

j = 1, 2

or, with the usual stacking of observation over i ,
y j = X j ⋅ β j +ε j ,

j = 1, 2.

⎛y ⎞
y j = ⎜⎜ 1 ⎟⎟ ,
⎝ y2 ⎠

⎡X
Xj =⎢ 1
⎣0

E[ε j ] = 0,

E[ε jε j ' ] = V ,

0⎤
,
X 2 ⎥⎦

⎛β ⎞
β j = ⎜⎜ 1 ⎟⎟,
⎝ β2 ⎠

V =∑⊗I,

⎛ε ⎞
ε j = ⎜⎜ 1 ⎟⎟
⎝ε2 ⎠

σ 12 ⎤
⎡σ
∑ = ⎢ 11
⎥,
⎣σ 21 σ 22 ⎦

where ⊗ is the Kronecker production notation.
The SUR model permits nonzero covariance between the error terms ε ij and ε ik
for a given individual i across equations j and k , i.e., Cov(ε i , j , ε i ,k ) = σ ij , while
assuming Cov(ε i , j , ε i ',k ) = 0 , where i ' represents any individual other than individual i . It
is the potential nonzero covariance across equations j and k that allows for an
improvement in efficiency of the generalized least squares (GLS) relative the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimator of each β j .
Denoting the element in the ith row and jth column of ∑ −1 by σ ij , i.e.,
∑ −1 ≡ [σ ij ] . Assuming ∑ is known, the GLS estimator of the vector β is

65

For more detail discussion on this, please refer to Section 15.4 of Greene (2000).
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βˆGLS = [ X 'V −1 X ]−1 X 'V −1 y
= [ X ' (∑ −1 ⊗ I ) X ]−1 X ' (∑ −1 ⊗ I ) y
⎡σ 11 X ' X
= ⎢ 21 1 1
⎣σ X '2 X 1

⎡ 2 1j
⎤
σ X '1 y j ⎥
∑
12
⎢
σ X '1 X 2 ⎤ j =1
⎥.
⎥ ⎢ 2
σ 22 X '2 X 2 ⎦ ⎢ σ 2 j X ' y ⎥
2
j⎥
⎢∑
⎣ j =1
⎦
−1

The asymptotic covariance matrix for the GLS estimator is the inverse matrix in the
above equation.
Zellner (1962) and Dwivedi and Srivastava (1978) have analyzed some special
cases of this model. First, if the equations are actually unrelated, that is, σ ij = 0 for i ≠ j ,
then the GLS estimator is the OLS estimator. Second, if the regressors of these equations
are identical, that is, X i = X j , then βˆOLS = βˆGLS . However, the greater the correlation of
the disturbances, the greater the efficiency gain accruing to GLS.
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APPENDIX D: HOMOSKEDASTICITY TESTS

In this appendix, we introduce two popular tests for heteroskedasticity: the White
test and the Breusch and Pagan test. The homoskedasticity assumption, Var (ui | X ) = σ ２ ,
can be replaced with the weaker assumption that the squared error, ui2 , is uncorrelated
with all the independent variables, the squares of the independent variables, and all the
cross products. This observation motivated White (1980) to propose a test for
heteroskedasticity. The White test is carried out by obtaining n ⋅ R 2 in the regression of
uˆi2 on a constant and all the independent variables, the squares of the independent
variables, and all the cross products. The statistics asymptotically form a chi-squared
distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of regressors in this
regression, including the constant.
Breusch and Pagan (1979) have devised a Lagrange multiplier test of the
hypothesis that ui2 = σ 2 ⋅ f (α 0 + α '⋅ zi ) , where zi is a vector of independent variables. The
model is homoskedastic if α = 0 . The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier statistic is
given by:
uˆ 2
uˆ 2
1
LM = [( i )' Z ( Z ' Z ) −1 Z ' ( i )] .
uˆ ' uˆ / n
2 uˆ ' uˆ / n
Under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, LM is asymptotically distributed as χ 2
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables in zi .
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APPENDIX E: FIXED EFFECTS AND RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS

In this appendix, we introduce two common approaches that we employ in the
estimation of Equation (15) to control the individual effect, ai , in the data. 66 The first
approach is the fixed effects model. By fixed effects transforming the Equation (15), we
obtain Equation (17):
&y&i ,t = X&&i ,t ⋅ β + ε&&i ,t

(17)
Ti

Ti

t =1

t =1

where &y&i ,t ≡ yi ,t − yi , X&&i ,t ≡ X i ,t − X i , ε&&i ,t ≡ ε i ,t − ε i , yi = T −1 ∑ yi ,t , X i = T −1 ∑ X i ,t , and
Ti

ε i = T −1 ∑ ε i ,t . The time demeaning of the Equation (17) has removed the individual
t =1

effect, ai . In absence of ai in our Equation (17), we can estimate this equation by pooled
OLS. Our fixed effects (FE) estimator, βˆFE , is the pooled OLS estimator from the
regression &y&i ,t on X&&i ,t , which can be expressed as

βˆFE

⎞
⎛ N Ti
= ⎜⎜ ∑∑ X&&i ,t ' X&&i ,t ⎟⎟
⎠
⎝ i =1 t =1

−1

⎞
⎛ N Ti &&
⎜⎜ ∑∑ X i ,t ' &y&i ,t ⎟⎟ .
⎠
⎝ i =1 t =1

The robust variance matrix estimator of βˆ FE is

( )

N
−1 ⎛
−1
⎞
Aˆ var βˆFE = (X&& ' X&& ) ⎜ ∑ X&&i ' uˆi uˆi ' X&&i ⎟(X&& ' X&& )
⎝ i=1
⎠

where uˆ i ≡ &y&i − X&& i βˆ FE denotes the fixed effects residuals. This robust variance matrix is
suggested by Arellano (1987) and the robust standard errors are obtained as the square
roots of the diagonal elements of this matrix, which are valid in the presence of any
66

For a thorough discussion of this topic please refer to Greene (2000), Wooldridge (2000, 2002).
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heteroskedasticity or serial correlation.
The second approach to estimate Equation (16) is to apply the random effects
model. A random effects analysis puts the individual effect, ai , into the error term. The
random effects model assumes that the individual effect is uncorrelated with each
independent variable. Since ai is in the composite error in each time period, the ui ,t are
serial correlated across time. Let σ ε2 = Var (ε i ,t ) , σ a2 = Var (ai ) . Under the random effect
assumption, the serial correlation can be expressed as
Corr(ui ,t , ui , s ) = σ a2 /(σ a2 + σ ε2 ), ∀ t ≠ s .

Wooldridge (2002) derives the GLS transformation that eliminates serial
correlation in the errors. The random effects transformation of Equation (15) can be
showed as
~
~
yi ,t = X i ,t ⋅ β + ε~i ,t

(18)

~
yi ,t ≡ yi ,t − λ yi , X i ,t ≡ X i ,t − λ X i , ε~i ,t ≡ ε i ,t − λ ε i , and λ = 1 − [σ ε2 /(σ ε2 + σ a2 )]1 / 2 .
where ~
The tilde again denotes the time averages. The random effects estimator, βˆRE , is the
~
yi ,t on X i ,t , and can be expressed as
pooled OLS estimator from the regression ~

βˆ

RE

⎛ N Ti
ˆ −1 X ⎞⎟
= ⎜⎜ ∑∑ X i ,t ' Ω
i ,t ⎟
⎝ i=1 t =1
⎠

−1

⎛ N Ti
ˆ −1 y ⎞⎟
⎜⎜ ∑∑ X i ,t ' Ω
i ,t ⎟
⎝ i=1 t =1
⎠

where Ω̂ takes the form
⎛ σˆ a2 + σˆ ε2
⎜
2
ˆ = ⎜ σˆ a
Ω
⎜
M
⎜
⎜ σˆ 2
a
⎝

σˆ a2
σˆ a2 + σˆ ε2
M
L

σˆ a2

⎞
⎟
L
M
⎟
.
2
O
σˆ a ⎟⎟
σˆ a2 σˆ a2 + σˆ ε2 ⎟⎠
L
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σˆ ε2 and σˆ a2 , are consistent estimators of σ ε2 and σ a2 , which are based on the pooled OLS
or fixed effects residuals. The robust variance matrix estimator of β̂ RE is given as

( )

−1

N
N
⎛ N
ˆ −1 X ⎞⎟ ⎛⎜ ∑ X ' Ω
ˆ −1vˆ vˆ ' Ω
ˆ −1 X ⎞⎟⎛⎜ ∑ X ' Ω
ˆ −1 X ⎞⎟
Aˆ var βˆRE = ⎜ ∑ X i ' Ω
i
i
i i
i
i
i
⎝ i=1
⎠ ⎝ i=1
⎠⎝ i=1
⎠

−1

where vˆi ≡ yi − X i β̂ FE is the random effects residuals. The robust standard errors are
obtained in the same way from the robust variance matrix estimator as we have discussed
in the case of the fixed effect approach.
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APPENDIX F: THE TEST FOR INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS VERSUS POOLED OLS

Recall our estimation of Equation (15):
PSEi ,t = β 0 + β1 ⋅ DECi ,t + β 2 ⋅ UNI i ,t + β 3 ⋅ ELEi ,t + β 4 ⋅ Wi ,t + ai + ε i ,t

(15)

where ai are called an individual effect or individual heterogeneity. We rewrite Equation
(15) as:
yi ,t = X i ,t ⋅ β + ui ,t

(16)

where yi ,t is our dependent variable, public sector employees as a percentage of
population of country i at time t and X i ,t includes a constant term and all our dependent
variables of country i at time t . u i ,t ≡ ai + ε i ,t are the composite errors. Under the
assumption that there is no correlation between X i ,t and ui ,t , the pooled OLS estimator
can be used to obtain a consistent estimator of β in estimation of Equation (16). Ignoring
the individual effects, the pooled OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent if the
individual effects are correlated with the dependent variables.
Under the assumption of the individual effects being jointly equal to zero, the
pooled OLS estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator. Breusch and Pagan (1979)
have derived a statistic using the Lagrange multiplier in a likelihood setting to test the
presence of individual effects. The null hypothesis of the absence of individual effects,
statistically equivalent to H 0 : σ a2 = 0 , is against the alternative hypothesis of the
presence of individual effects, or H1 : σ a2 ≠ 0 . The test statistic is given by
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2
⎤
⎡ N ⎡T
⎤
⎥
⎢ ∑ ⎢ ∑ ei , t ⎥
nT ⎢ i =1 ⎣ t =1 ⎦
LM =
− 1⎥
N T
⎥
⎢
2(T − 1)
2
⎥
⎢ ∑∑ ei ,t
⎥⎦
⎢⎣ i =1 t =1

2

where ei ,t is the OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, the LM statistic forms a chisquared distribution with one degree of freedom. 67

67

For detailed discussion of this section please refer to Greene (2000), Chapter 14.
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APPENDIX G: THE HAUSMAN TEST

The distinction between fixed and random effects models is the assumption
whether or not the individual effects are correlated with the independent variables.
Hausman (1978) test, based on the difference between the random effects and fixed
effects estimates, can be used to test the correlation between the individual effects and the
independent variables. Under the null hypothesis of no correlation, both fixed effects and
random effects estimates are consistent, but fixed effects estimate is inefficient, whereas
under the alternative hypothesis, the fixed effects estimate is consistent, but the random
effects estimate is not. Under the null hypothesis, these two estimates should not differ
systematically. The Hausman statistic can be computed as follows:
H = ( βˆFE − βˆRE )'[Â var(βˆFE ) − Â var(βˆRE )]−1 ( βˆFE − βˆRE ) .

Under the null hypothesis, the Hausman statistic is asymptotically distributed as
chi-squared with k − 1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of regressors in this
regression, including the constant.
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APPENDIX H: THE GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS ESTIMATION

In this appendix, we introduce the third approach, the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimation, which we employed to estimate Equation (15). We have
rewritten the Equation (15) as:
yi ,t = X i ,t ⋅ β + ui ,t

(16)

The intuition of GMM is to use the moment conditions that are assumed to be
satisfied to minimize the GMM objective function. Thus, we need the moment condition
E ( X ' u ) = 0 in Equation (16) to be satisfied. In testing for the endogeneity of variable the

degree of fiscal decentralization, we have a set of three additional exogenous variables.
Let Z be the set of our exogenous variables, including the independent variables in
Equation (16) and three fractionalization index variables. Consequently, our moment
condition can be rewritten as E ( Z ' u ) = 0 . Our GMM method is to choose an estimator to
minimize the objective function:
J ( β ) = n ⋅ g ( β )'W g ( β ) ,

where g ( β ) =

1
Z ' u , W is an L × L weighting matrix and L is the number of exogenous
n

variables in Z . There are as many GMM estimators as there are choices of weighting
matrix W . The efficient GMM estimator is the GMM estimator with an optimal
weighting matrix. Let S be the covariance matrix of the moment conditions, that is,
S=

1
E ( Z ' uu ' Z ) . The efficient GMM estimator, βˆEGMM , is obtained by choosing
n
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W = S −1 and can be expressed as: 68

βˆEGMM = ( X ' ZS −1Z ' X ) −1 X ' ZS −1Z ' y
with asymptotic variance
1
Aˆ var(βˆEGMM ) = ( X ' ZS −1Z ' X ) −1 .
n
Under the condition that there are no endogenous regressors in our regression
model and we have additional moment conditions, our efficient GMM estimator is that of
Cragg’s heteroskedasticity OLS. This estimator is more efficient than OLS in the
presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form and the efficiency gains drive from the
additional moment conditions (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1992)

68

For more detail discussion on GMM, please refer to Greene (2000), Chapter 11 and Wooldridge (2002),
Chapter 14.
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APPENDIX I: SPATIAL DEPENDENCY TESTS

Spatial dependence tests measure the extent of spatial autocorrelation among
observations in a given geographic space. There are a number of tests that are used for
this purpose, among which Moran’s I and Getis and Ord’s G statistics are most
commonly used. We use these two approaches to test for spatial autocorrelation in this
study. 69
The Moran’s I statistic is a weighted correlation coefficient used to detect
departures from spatial randomness and is considered to be global in the sense that
estimates the overall degree of spatial autocorrelation for our dataset. This statistic is
given as:
n

n ∑
I = ⋅ i =1
S0

(

)(

∑ (y

)

M ⋅ yi − y ⋅ y j − y
n

i =1

i

−y

)

, ∀j ≠ i

2

n

where M is the spatial weight matrix, y =

∑y
i =1

i

, n is the number of observations, and S0

n

is a standardization factor which is equal to all summation of all elements in the weight
matrix. The expected value of Moran’s I is −

1
. The null hypothesis for the Moran’s
(n − 1)

I test is the absence of spatial dependence. The I statistic for our data exceeding its
expected value indicates that there is positive spatial autocorrelation among the
observations of our data.

69

For more detail about these two spatial dependency tests, please refer to Anselin (1988), Anselin and
Florax (1995), and Getis and Ord (1992).
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The Getis and Ord’s G statistic is a multiplicative measure of overall spatial
association of values which fall within a given distance of each other. The G statistic is
given as:
n

G=

n

∑∑ M ⋅ y ⋅y
i

i = i j =1
n
n

∑∑ y ⋅y
i = i j =1

i

j

, ∀j ≠ i .

j

n

n

∑∑ M
The expected value of Getis and Ord’s G statistic is
exceeding its expected value indicates a clustering.
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i = i j =1

n(n − 1)

. The G statistic for our data
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